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</style>
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</head>
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<body>
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<div class="document" id="santiago">
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<h1 class="title">Santiago</h1>
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<h2 class="subtitle" id="less-discoverable-discovery">Less Discoverable Discovery?</h2>
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<!-- -*- mode: rst; fill-column: 80; mode: auto-fill; -*- -->
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<div class="section" id="disclaimer">
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<h1>Disclaimer</h1>
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<p><strong>The following is an ugly hack. Beware!</strong></p>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="santiago-s-map">
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<h1>Santiago's Map</h1>
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<p>Santiago manages service discovery between FreedomBoxen, coordinating
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connections between arbitrary servers and services. In essence, A requests a
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service from B, B replies with the service's location, and A uses that location
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for the service.</p>
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<ol class="arabic simple">
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<li>A sends a signed (and encrypted?) message to B's Santiago, requesting
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information, in the form of:<ul>
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<li>Will <em>X</em> do <em>Y</em> for me?</li>
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<li>Optional: Reply to my Santiago at <em>Z</em>.</li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li>If B does not recognize A or does not trust A, it stays silent.</li>
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<li>If B recognizes and trusts A, it replies with a signed (and encrypted?)
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message to A's Santiago, giving the location of A's usable service. If no
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service is available, it replies with a rejection.</li>
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</ol>
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<p>In a nutshell, that's the important part. There are additional details to
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manage, but they're implied and built on the system above.</p>
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<div class="section" id="our-cheats">
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<h2>Our Cheats</h2>
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<p>Right now, we're cheating. We start by pairing boxes, exchanging both
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box-specific PGP keys and Tor Hidden Service IDs. This allows boxes to trust
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and communicate with one another, regardless of any adverserial interference.
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Or, rather, any adverserial interference will be obvious and ignorable.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="message-exchange">
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<h2>Message Exchange</h2>
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<p>The Santiago service is running on <em>B</em>, waiting for connections. When it
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receives a request message, that message must be signed by a known and trusted
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party. If it is acceptably signed (with a known, and valid ID), <em>B</em> will
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reply to <em>A</em>'s Santiago with an acceptably signed message.</p>
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<p>The contents of the request message are as follows:</p>
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<ul class="simple">
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<li>I am requesting service <em>X</em>.</li>
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<li>I am requesting that the service be performed by <em>Y</em>.</li>
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<li>Optional: Reply to this message at <em>Z</em>.</li>
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</ul>
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<p>The message is signed by <em>A</em>, and optionally encrypted (if the message is
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proxied, it must contain a "To" header). If <em>A</em> includes a location stanza,
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<em>B</em> MUST respect that location in its response and update that location for
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its Santiago service from <em>A</em> going forward.</p>
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<p>In this document, I elide the Santiago acknowledgements (because they add a lot
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of unnecessary noise - we can assume communication failures are failures of
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acknolwedgement receipt). But, after each message that needs a response, an
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acceptably signed acknowledgement message is returned. Otherwise the sender
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preferentially moves on to the recipient's next Santiago address after a
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sufficient amount of time has passed. An example of this communication, with
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these details specified, follows:</p>
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<table class="docutils field-list" frame="void" rules="none">
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<col class="field-name" />
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<col class="field-body" />
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<tbody valign="top">
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<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> A:</th><td class="field-body">I'll gladly serve <em>X</em> for you, at <em>Z</em>, my good fellow.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> B:</th><td class="field-body">(No response)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> A:</th><td class="field-body"><em>(using a different Santiago address)</em> I'm serving <em>X</em> for <em>A</em> at <em>Z</em>.</td>
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</tr>
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<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> B:</th><td class="field-body">(Acknowledgment)</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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</div>
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<div class="section" id="storing-service-data-and-network-structure">
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<h2>Storing Service Data and Network Structure</h2>
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<p>How are these data stored, to prevent both A and B from having to dance the
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Santiago for each and every request?</p>
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<p>Each node contains two dictionaries/hash-tables listing (1) what they serve and
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who they serve it to, and (2) what services they use, who from, and where that
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service is located.</p>
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<div class="section" id="what-i-host-and-serve">
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<h3>What I Host and Serve</h3>
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<p>I offer these services to others.</p>
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<p>These data are stored as pair of dictionaries:</p>
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<ul>
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<li><p class="first">The GPG ID to Service dictionary. This lists which service each user is
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authorized for:</p>
|
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<pre class="literal-block">
|
||||
0x0928: [ "proxy": "proxy", "wiki": "wiki",
|
||||
"drinking buddy": "drinking buddy" ]
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0x7747: [ "wiki": "wiki", "proxy": "restricted_proxy" ]
|
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</pre>
|
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</li>
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<li><p class="first">The Service to Location dictionary. This lists the locations each service
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runs on:</p>
|
||||
<pre class="literal-block">
|
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"wiki": [ 192.168.1.1, "superduperwiki.onion" ]
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"proxy": [ 8.8.8.8 ]
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"restricted_proxy": [ 4.4.4.4 ]
|
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</pre>
|
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</li>
|
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</ul>
|
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</div>
|
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<div class="section" id="others-services-i-know-of">
|
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<h3>Others' Services I Know Of</h3>
|
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<p>I consume these services, they are offered by others.</p>
|
||||
<p>These data are stored as a triple-key dictionary, with the following mappings:</p>
|
||||
<pre class="literal-block">
|
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Service X: { GPG ID1: [ location, location, location ],
|
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GPG ID2: [ location, location ], }
|
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Service Y: { GPG ID2: [ location, location, location ],
|
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GPG ID3: [ location, location ], }
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>This allows fast lookup from the service desired to the users that host the
|
||||
service, to the actual locations that service is offered. This allows the user
|
||||
to quickly decide which service provider to use and to try all locations
|
||||
controlled by that service provider very quickly and easily.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="data-use">
|
||||
<h2>Data Use</h2>
|
||||
<table class="docutils field-list" frame="void" rules="none">
|
||||
<col class="field-name" />
|
||||
<col class="field-body" />
|
||||
<tbody valign="top">
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">TODO:</th><td class="field-body">Revise to reduce communication to logical minimum number of connections,
|
||||
exchanges, and communications.</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
<p>When <em>A</em> is connecting to <em>B</em>'s service, it will attempt to connect to that
|
||||
service, which B will validate before permitting the connection. If the service
|
||||
is non-responsive, <em>A</em> will query <em>B</em> for the service. If <em>B</em> is generally
|
||||
non-responsive, <em>A</em> will move on to <em>C</em>. <em>A</em> will ask <em>C</em> for the service. If
|
||||
<em>C</em> cannot provide the service, <em>A</em> will ask <em>C</em> to request the service from
|
||||
<em>B</em>. If <em>C</em> can reach <em>B</em> and <em>B</em> authorizes <em>A</em>, <em>B</em> will respond
|
||||
affirmatively to <em>A</em> with the service's location.</p>
|
||||
<table class="docutils field-list" frame="void" rules="none">
|
||||
<col class="field-name" />
|
||||
<col class="field-body" />
|
||||
<tbody valign="top">
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> B:</th><td class="field-body">(Connecting to Service!)</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B:</th><td class="field-body">(Validating Service and rejecting for some reason, e.x., A hasn't been
|
||||
reauthorized for this service recently enough, and because it's Wednesday.)</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> A:</th><td class="field-body">(No response)</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> B:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> A:</th><td class="field-body">(No response, A can't reach B's Santiago.)</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> C:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">C -> A:</th><td class="field-body">No!</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> C:</th><td class="field-body">Will B serve X?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">C -> B:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X for A?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> A:</th><td class="field-body">Hey, buddy, here's X!</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="proxied-service-requesting">
|
||||
<h2>Proxied service requesting</h2>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="the-simple-case">
|
||||
<h3>The Simple Case</h3>
|
||||
<p>I'm looking for somebody to provide a service, <em>X</em>.</p>
|
||||
<p><em>A</em> sends a request to <em>C</em>, and <em>C</em> doesn't respond. <em>A</em> requests the
|
||||
service from <em>B</em> and <em>B</em> NBKs. <em>A</em> requests that <em>B</em> proxy my request
|
||||
to <em>C</em>, in case <em>B</em> can reach <em>C</em>. <em>C</em> replies directly to <em>A</em>, and
|
||||
we begin communicating on that service:</p>
|
||||
<table class="docutils field-list" frame="void" rules="none">
|
||||
<col class="field-name" />
|
||||
<col class="field-body" />
|
||||
<tbody valign="top">
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> C:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">C -> A:</th><td class="field-body">(No response)</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> B:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> A:</th><td class="field-body">No!</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> B:</th><td class="field-body">Will C serve X?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> C:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X for A?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">C -> A:</th><td class="field-body">Hey, buddy, here's X! Let's go out for beer later.</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="more-complicated-cases">
|
||||
<h3>More Complicated Cases</h3>
|
||||
<p>I know <em>D</em> offers a service, <em>X</em>, but I can't get in touch with it.</p>
|
||||
<p><em>A</em> requests <em>X</em> from <em>D</em>, and <em>D</em> never responds. <em>A</em> requests that <em>B</em> find
|
||||
<em>D</em>. <em>B</em> doesn't know <em>D</em> and forwards the request to a friend <em>C</em>. <em>C</em> knows
|
||||
<em>D</em> and sends the message along. <em>D</em> tries to respond directly to <em>A</em>, but
|
||||
can't, so it sends replies back up the chain.</p>
|
||||
<table class="docutils field-list" frame="void" rules="none">
|
||||
<col class="field-name" />
|
||||
<col class="field-body" />
|
||||
<tbody valign="top">
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> D:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">D -> A:</th><td class="field-body">(No response)</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> B:</th><td class="field-body">Will D serve X for me?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> C:</th><td class="field-body">Will D serve X for A?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">C -> D:</th><td class="field-body">Will you serve X for A?</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">D -> A:</th><td class="field-body">Hey, buddy, here's X!</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">A -> D:</th><td class="field-body">(No response)</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">D -> C:</th><td class="field-body">I'm serving X for A.</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">C -> B:</th><td class="field-body">D's serving X for A.</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
<tr class="field"><th class="field-name">B -> A:</th><td class="field-body">D's serving X for you.</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
</tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
<p>Each message is signed, but only the first message (A's message) is inviolable.
|
||||
Each client then passes the message, stripping off intermediary signatures, and
|
||||
then signing the message for each of its friends.</p>
|
||||
<p>A message looks like:</p>
|
||||
<pre class="literal-block">
|
||||
---- A's Signed Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
To: D's GPG key.
|
||||
---- D's Encrypted Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
Hey *D*, will you serve *X* for me?
|
||||
Please reply to 5.onion.
|
||||
---- D's Encrypted Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
---- A's Signed Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>A forwarded message, from B to C, looks like:</p>
|
||||
<pre class="literal-block">
|
||||
---- B's Signed Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
---- A's Signed Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
To: D's GPG key.
|
||||
---- D's Encrypted Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
Hey *D*, will you serve *X* for me?
|
||||
Please reply to 5.onion.
|
||||
---- D's Encrypted Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
---- A's Signed Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
---- B's Signed Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<p>When forwarded over again, from C to D, it looks like:</p>
|
||||
<pre class="literal-block">
|
||||
---- C's Signed Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
---- A's Signed Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
To: D's GPG key.
|
||||
---- D's Encrypted Message Starts Here ----
|
||||
Hey *D*, will you serve *X* for me?
|
||||
Please reply to 5.onion.
|
||||
---- D's Encrypted Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
---- A's Signed Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
---- C's Signed Message Ends Here ----
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="unit-tests">
|
||||
<h1>Unit Tests</h1>
|
||||
<p>These buggers are neat. We need to fake known and pre-determined communications
|
||||
to verify the servers and clients are correctly and independently responding
|
||||
according to the protocol.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="attacks">
|
||||
<h1>Attacks</h1>
|
||||
<p>Of <em>course</em> this is vulnerable. It's on the internet, isn't it?</p>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="discovery">
|
||||
<h2>Discovery</h2>
|
||||
<p>A discovered box is shut down or compromised. It can lie to its requestors and
|
||||
not perform its functions. It can also allow connections and expose
|
||||
connecting clients. If the client is compromisable (within reach), it also can
|
||||
be compromised. We can try, but every service that isn't run directly over Tor
|
||||
identifies one user to another.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="deception">
|
||||
<h2>Deception</h2>
|
||||
<p>This is probably the largest worry, where B fakes A's responses.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="mitigations">
|
||||
<h1>Mitigations</h1>
|
||||
<p>We gain a lot by relying on the WOT, and only direct links in the WOT. We also
|
||||
gain a lot by requiring every communication to be signed (and maximally
|
||||
encrypted).</p>
|
||||
<p>Once a key is compromised, we're vulnerable, but to what exactly? What attacks
|
||||
can an adversary who's compromised a secret key perform? As long as you don't
|
||||
have any publicly identifiable (or public-facing) services in your Santiago,
|
||||
then not much. If you're identifiable by your Santiago, and you've permitted
|
||||
the attacker to see an identifiable service (including your Santiago instances),
|
||||
that service and all co-located services could be shut down. If the service
|
||||
identifies you (and not just your box), you're vulnerable. An attacker will
|
||||
shortly identify all the services you've given it access to.</p>
|
||||
<p>An attacker can try to identify your friends, though will have trouble if you
|
||||
send your proxied requests with non-public methods, or you don't proxy at all.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div class="section" id="outstanding-questions">
|
||||
<h1>Outstanding Questions</h1>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user