Clarified documentation a little.

This commit is contained in:
Nick Daly 2012-03-04 17:45:32 -06:00
parent 4dea8e4c2e
commit caffa8e1ea
2 changed files with 33 additions and 35 deletions

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@ -29,18 +29,18 @@ connections between arbitrary servers and services. In essence, A requests a
service from B, B replies with the service's location, and A uses that location
for the service.
#. A sends a signed (and encrypted?) message to B's Santiago, requesting
information, in the form of:
#. A requests service information from B with a signed and encrypted message in
the form of:
- Will *X* do *Y* for me?
- Optional: Reply to my Santiago at *Z*.
#. If B does not recognize A or does not trust A, it stays silent.
#. If B recognizes and trusts A, it replies with a signed (and encrypted?)
message to A's Santiago, giving the location of A's usable service. If B
will not (cannot or won't) provide A the service, B replies with a
rejection. This message is in the form of:
#. If B recognizes and trusts A, it replies with a signed and encrypted message
to A's Santiago, giving the location of A's usable service. If B will not
(cannot or won't) provide A the service, B replies with a rejection. This
message is in the form of:
- *X* will (not) do *Y* for *Z*.
@ -51,22 +51,13 @@ Each Santiago process is responsible for managing a single key and set of
friendships, so multiple Santiagi per box (each with a different purpose or
social circle) is completely possible and intended.
Our Cheats
----------
Right now, we're cheating. There's no discovery. We start by pairing boxes,
exchanging both box-specific PGP keys and Tor Hidden Service IDs. This allows
boxes to trust and communicate with one another, regardless of any adverserial
interference. Or, rather, any adverserial interference will be obvious and
ignorable.
Message Exchange
----------------
The Santiago service is running on *B*, waiting for connections. When it
receives a request message, that message must be signed by a known and trusted
party. If it is acceptably signed (with a known, and valid ID), *B* will
reply to *A*'s Santiago with an acceptably signed message.
party. If it is acceptably signed (with a known and valid ID), *B* will reply
to *A*'s Santiago with an acceptably signed message.
The contents of the request message are as follows:
@ -79,10 +70,10 @@ proxied, it must contain a "To" header). If *A* includes a location stanza,
*B* MUST respect that location in its response and update that location for
its Santiago service from *A* going forward.
In this document, I elide the Santiago acknowledgements (because they add a lot
In this document, I elide the Santiago acknowledgments (because they add a lot
of unnecessary noise - we can assume communication failures are failures of
acknolwedgement receipt). But, after each message that needs a response, an
acceptably signed acknowledgement message is returned. Otherwise the sender
acknowledgment receipt). But, after each message that needs a response, an
acceptably signed acknowledgment message is returned. Otherwise the sender
preferentially moves on to the recipient's next Santiago address after a
sufficient amount of time has passed. An example of this communication, with
these details specified, follows:
@ -102,8 +93,6 @@ Each node contains two dictionaries/hash-tables listing (1) what they serve and
who they serve it to, and (2) what services they use, who from, and where that
service is located.
These are stored in the "Santiago" database, as three individual tables.
What I Host and Serve
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@ -178,7 +167,7 @@ The Simple Case
I'm looking for somebody to provide a service, *X*.
*A* sends a request to *C*, and *C* doesn't respond. *A* requests the
service from *B* and *B* NBKs. *A* requests that *B* proxy my request
service from *B* and *B* NAKs. *A* requests that *B* proxy my request
to *C*, in case *B* can reach *C*. *C* replies directly to *A*, and
we begin communicating on that service:
@ -261,18 +250,27 @@ Anachronisms
It's odd because this has a potential for a number of irrelevant communications.
It's possible for A to send multiple requests to B and for B to receive multiple
requests before A acknowledges responses.
requests before A acknowledges responses. Removing these oddly timed messages
requires A and B to exchange more information (acknowledgments and replies would
need to include the service location that responded). I'm not sure whether
sending more messages or identifying the active service to friends is the better
option. Probably the latter, because it allows for communication to take fewer
messages (an order of magnitude less, if proxying is involved).
A -> B, A -> B, B -> A, A -> B.
Code Structure
--------------
Yeah, I really need to hammer this part out. Stupid MVC model.
Code/Object Structure
---------------------
So, listeners receive responses and pass them up to the controller that queues
it for the responder. Lots of listeners, a single responder. Listeners have a
single method, while responders have multiple (per type of response?).
it for the sender. Up to one listener and sender per protocol.
Our Cheats
----------
Right now, we're cheating. There's no discovery. We start by pairing boxes,
exchanging both box-specific PGP keys and Tor Hidden Service IDs. This allows
boxes to trust and communicate with one another, regardless of any adverserial
interference. Or, rather, any adverserial interference will be obvious and
ignorable.
Unit Tests
==========

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@ -254,9 +254,9 @@ class SantiagoSender(object):
"""Sends the request to another server."""
# TODO pull this off, another day.
return (self.santiago.instance +" is not %(server)s. proxying request. " +
"%(key)s is requesting the %(service)s from %(server)s. " +
"%(hops)d hops remain.") % locals()
return ("%(key)s is requesting the %(service)s from %(server)s. " +
self.santiago.instance + " is not %(server)s. " +
"proxying request. %(hops)d hops remain.") % locals()
if __name__ == "__main__":