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fix(nostr): reserve two-hour DM timestamp margin
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@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import java.math.BigInteger
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*/
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object NostrCrypto {
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internal const val NIP17_DEFAULT_MAX_PAST_SECONDS = 85_500
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internal const val NIP17_DEFAULT_MAX_PAST_SECONDS = 79_200
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private val secureRandom = SecureRandom()
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// NIP-44 v2 only
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@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ object NostrCrypto {
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}
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/**
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* Random timestamp in the past, defaulting to 23h45m to leave slack inside iOS's 24h lookback.
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* Random timestamp in the past, defaulting to 22 hours to leave 2 hours of slack inside iOS's 24-hour lookback.
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*/
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fun randomizeTimestampUpToPast(maxPastSeconds: Int = NIP17_DEFAULT_MAX_PAST_SECONDS): Int {
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val now = (System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000).toInt()
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ object NostrProtocol {
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val rumorId = rumorBase.computeEventIdHex()
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val rumor = rumorBase.copy(id = rumorId)
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// 2. Seal the rumor with 15 minutes of slack inside iOS's 24-hour lookback.
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// 2. Seal the rumor with 2 hours of slack inside iOS's 24-hour lookback.
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val sealedEvent = createSeal(
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rumor = rumor,
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recipientPubkey = recipientPubkey,
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@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ class NostrProtocolTest {
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afterCreation: Int
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) {
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assertTrue(
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"$envelope timestamp must leave 15 minutes inside the iOS lookback",
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"$envelope timestamp must leave 2 hours inside the iOS lookback",
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createdAt >= beforeCreation - MAX_OUTBOUND_BACKDATE_SECONDS
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)
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assertTrue(
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@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ class NostrProtocolTest {
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private companion object {
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const val IOS_DM_LOOKBACK_SECONDS = 86_400
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const val TIMESTAMP_SAFETY_SLACK_SECONDS = 900
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const val TIMESTAMP_SAFETY_SLACK_SECONDS = 7_200
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const val MAX_OUTBOUND_BACKDATE_SECONDS =
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IOS_DM_LOOKBACK_SECONDS - TIMESTAMP_SAFETY_SLACK_SECONDS
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}
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ The remaining implementation work and milestone progress are tracked in
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| Inner payloads | Noise type bytes, private-message TLVs, peer-state TLVs, file-transfer TLVs, live-voice bursts, fragment header, sync request TLVs | `ClientRewriteWireContractTest`, `AuthenticatedPeerStateTest`, `PrivateMediaTransferPreparerTest`, `VoiceBurstPacketTest`, `FragmentManagerTest` |
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| Identity/security | Announcement extensions, capability bitfield endianness, Noise static-key binding, handshake identity binding, signatures | `IdentityAnnouncementTest`, `NoiseSessionManagerIdentityBindingTest`, `ClientRewritePrimitiveContractTest` |
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| Sync/routing | Stable packet IDs, GCS bitstream, replay collapse, TTL handling, relay choice, confirmed graph edges | `ClientRewritePrimitiveContractTest`, `GCSFilterTest`, `PacketRelayManagerTest`, `MeshGraphServiceTest`, `TransportBridgeServiceTest` |
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| Nostr | Bech32, secp256k1 key derivation, NIP-01 event IDs/signatures, NIP-44 authenticated encryption, NIP-13 PoW, authenticated NIP-17 seals, 23h45m outbound envelope randomization | `ClientRewriteNostrContractTest`, `NostrProtocolTest` |
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| Nostr | Bech32, secp256k1 key derivation, NIP-01 event IDs/signatures, NIP-44 authenticated encryption, NIP-13 PoW, authenticated NIP-17 seals, 22h outbound envelope randomization | `ClientRewriteNostrContractTest`, `NostrProtocolTest` |
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| Application state | Peer unions, canonical private conversations, chronological history, delivery/read behavior, media migration policy | `AppStateStoreTest`, `PrivateChatManagerTest`, `MediaSendingManagerMigrationTest` |
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## Golden-vector policy
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@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ Round-trip tests remain useful but are not sufficient on their own: an encoder
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and decoder can share the same defect. Each critical wire format therefore has
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at least one literal vector.
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NIP-17 receivers must use a lookback at least as long as the maximum timestamp
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NIP-17 receivers should reserve safety slack beyond the maximum timestamp
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randomization used by senders. Android caps outbound seal and gift-wrap
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randomization at 23h45m, leaving 15 minutes of slack inside iOS's 24-hour
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randomization at 22h, leaving 2 hours of slack inside iOS's 24-hour
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subscription window, while retaining its 48-hour receive lookback.
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## Rewrite acceptance gate
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