Merge 724b3ca986f2e781ba219ea18f418061b7a99534 into c127eb83ab94c069c32d37530d2faecd381cd2a8

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/BluetoothMeshService.kt

@@ -64,8 +64,7 @@ class BluetoothMeshService(private val context: Context) : TransportBridgeServic
             withAuthenticatedSession = encryptionService::withAuthenticatedSession,
             store = authenticatedPeerStateStore,
             localStateProvider = {
-                AuthenticatedPeerState(
-                    PeerCapabilities.LOCAL_SUPPORTED,
+                AuthenticatedPeerState.local(
                     requireNotNull(encryptionService.getSigningPublicKey())
                 )
             },

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/mesh/MeshCore.kt

@@ -65,8 +65,7 @@ class MeshCore(
             withAuthenticatedSession = encryptionService::withAuthenticatedSession,
             store = authenticatedPeerStateStore,
             localStateProvider = {
-                AuthenticatedPeerState(
-                    PeerCapabilities.LOCAL_SUPPORTED,
+                AuthenticatedPeerState.local(
                     requireNotNull(encryptionService.getSigningPublicKey())
                 )
             },

app/src/main/java/com/bitchat/android/model/AuthenticatedPeerState.kt

@@ -1,27 +1,51 @@
 package com.bitchat.android.model
 
+import com.bitchat.android.util.AppConstants
+
 /**
  * Canonical payload carried inside Noise payload type 0x21.
  *
  * Wire format:
  * `[version=0x01][type=0x01][len=1...8][minimal LE capabilities]`
  * `[type=0x02][len=32][Ed25519 public key]`
+ * `[type=0x03][len=2][reassembly fragment ceiling, big-endian]` (optional)
  *
- * Unknown TLVs are skipped. Both known fields must occur exactly once.
+ * Unknown TLVs are skipped. Both required fields must occur exactly once.
  */
 data class AuthenticatedPeerState(
     val capabilities: PeerCapabilities,
-    val signingPublicKey: ByteArray
+    val signingPublicKey: ByteArray,
+    /**
+     * How many BLE fragments this peer will reassemble for one packet.
+     *
+     * The private-media capability bit says a peer understands encrypted
+     * media; it says nothing about how much of it that peer can hold. A
+     * sender that has only the bit has to guess the ceiling from the packet
+     * type, and that guess is wrong for this client: `FragmentManager`
+     * rejects any stream above `MAX_FRAGMENTS_PER_ID` regardless of type,
+     * while a sender assuming the encrypted path implies a large reassembler
+     * will plan far more than that and see no failure.
+     *
+     * `null` means the peer did not advertise one, which is what every client
+     * released before this TLV sends.
+     */
+    val maxReassemblyFragments: Int? = null
 ) {
     init {
         require(signingPublicKey.size == SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE) {
             "Ed25519 public key must be 32 bytes"
         }
+        require(maxReassemblyFragments == null || maxReassemblyFragments in 1..0xFFFF) {
+            "Reassembly ceiling must fit the 2-byte wire field and admit at least one fragment"
+        }
     }
 
     fun encode(): ByteArray {
         val capabilityBytes = capabilities.encoded()
-        return buildList<Byte>(1 + 2 + capabilityBytes.size + 2 + signingPublicKey.size) {
+        val ceilingBytes = if (maxReassemblyFragments == null) 0 else 2 + CEILING_SIZE
+        return buildList<Byte>(
+            1 + 2 + capabilityBytes.size + 2 + signingPublicKey.size + ceilingBytes
+        ) {
             add(VERSION.toByte())
             add(CAPABILITIES_TLV.toByte())
             add(capabilityBytes.size.toByte())
@@ -29,6 +53,12 @@ data class AuthenticatedPeerState(
             add(SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_TLV.toByte())
             add(SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE.toByte())
             addAll(signingPublicKey.toList())
+            if (maxReassemblyFragments != null) {
+                add(MAX_REASSEMBLY_FRAGMENTS_TLV.toByte())
+                add(CEILING_SIZE.toByte())
+                add(((maxReassemblyFragments shr 8) and 0xFF).toByte())
+                add((maxReassemblyFragments and 0xFF).toByte())
+            }
         }.toByteArray()
     }
 
@@ -37,12 +67,30 @@ data class AuthenticatedPeerState(
         private const val CAPABILITIES_TLV = 0x01
         private const val SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_TLV = 0x02
         private const val SIGNING_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE = 32
+        private const val MAX_REASSEMBLY_FRAGMENTS_TLV = 0x03
+        private const val CEILING_SIZE = 2
+
+        /**
+         * This client's own state, as advertised to an authenticated peer.
+         *
+         * Built here rather than at each call site so the mesh services
+         * cannot drift apart, and so the advertised ceiling is pinned to the
+         * constant the reassembler enforces instead of being restated by
+         * hand next to a capability set.
+         */
+        fun local(signingPublicKey: ByteArray): AuthenticatedPeerState =
+            AuthenticatedPeerState(
+                PeerCapabilities.LOCAL_SUPPORTED,
+                signingPublicKey,
+                AppConstants.Fragmentation.MAX_FRAGMENTS_PER_ID
+            )
 
         fun decode(data: ByteArray): AuthenticatedPeerState? {
             if (data.firstOrNull()?.toInt()?.and(0xFF) != VERSION) return null
             var offset = 1
             var capabilities: PeerCapabilities? = null
             var signingPublicKey: ByteArray? = null
+            var maxReassemblyFragments: Int? = null
 
             while (offset < data.size) {
                 if (offset + 2 > data.size) return null
@@ -66,13 +114,30 @@ data class AuthenticatedPeerState(
                         signingPublicKey = value
                     }
 
+                    MAX_REASSEMBLY_FRAGMENTS_TLV -> {
+                        // Rejected rather than skipped like an unknown type: a
+                        // peer that meant to constrain the sender but sent a
+                        // field it cannot read must not be treated as having
+                        // said nothing, because "said nothing" falls back to
+                        // the permissive type guess.
+                        if (maxReassemblyFragments != null || length != CEILING_SIZE) return null
+                        val decoded = ((value[0].toInt() and 0xFF) shl 8) or
+                            (value[1].toInt() and 0xFF)
+                        if (decoded == 0) return null
+                        maxReassemblyFragments = decoded
+                    }
+
                     else -> Unit
                 }
             }
 
             val decodedCapabilities = capabilities ?: return null
             val decodedSigningKey = signingPublicKey ?: return null
-            return AuthenticatedPeerState(decodedCapabilities, decodedSigningKey)
+            return AuthenticatedPeerState(
+                decodedCapabilities,
+                decodedSigningKey,
+                maxReassemblyFragments
+            )
         }
     }
 
@@ -80,7 +145,12 @@ data class AuthenticatedPeerState(
         this === other ||
             (other is AuthenticatedPeerState &&
                 capabilities == other.capabilities &&
-                signingPublicKey.contentEquals(other.signingPublicKey))
+                signingPublicKey.contentEquals(other.signingPublicKey) &&
+                maxReassemblyFragments == other.maxReassemblyFragments)
 
-    override fun hashCode(): Int = 31 * capabilities.hashCode() + signingPublicKey.contentHashCode()
+    override fun hashCode(): Int {
+        var result = 31 * capabilities.hashCode() + signingPublicKey.contentHashCode()
+        result = 31 * result + (maxReassemblyFragments ?: 0)
+        return result
+    }
 }

app/src/test/kotlin/com/bitchat/android/model/AuthenticatedPeerStateTest.kt

@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
 package com.bitchat.android.model
 
+import com.bitchat.android.util.AppConstants
+
 import org.junit.Assert.assertArrayEquals
 import org.junit.Assert.assertEquals
 import org.junit.Assert.assertNull
+import org.junit.Assert.assertTrue
+import org.junit.Assert.fail
 import org.junit.Test
 
 class AuthenticatedPeerStateTest {
@@ -65,4 +69,106 @@ class AuthenticatedPeerStateTest {
         assertEquals(0x21, encoded[0].toInt() and 0xFF)
         assertEquals(NoisePayloadType.PEER_STATE, NoisePayload.decode(encoded)?.type)
     }
+
+    // reassembly ceiling (TLV 0x03)
+
+    @Test
+    fun `ceiling round-trips as a two-byte big-endian TLV`() {
+        val state = AuthenticatedPeerState(
+            PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA,
+            signingKey,
+            AppConstants.Fragmentation.MAX_FRAGMENTS_PER_ID
+        )
+
+        val encoded = state.encode()
+
+        assertArrayEquals(
+            byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x20) + signingKey +
+                byteArrayOf(0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00),
+            encoded
+        )
+        assertEquals(state, AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(encoded))
+        assertEquals(256, AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(encoded)?.maxReassemblyFragments)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `a payload without the ceiling decodes as not advertised`() {
+        // Exactly what every client released before this TLV emits. It must
+        // read as "did not say", never as a ceiling of zero.
+        val legacy = AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, signingKey).encode()
+
+        assertEquals(1 + 4 + 34, legacy.size)
+        assertNull(AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(legacy)?.maxReassemblyFragments)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `an unknown trailing TLV still leaves the ceiling readable`() {
+        // The compatibility direction that lets this ship independently: the
+        // decoder ignores types it does not know, so a peer that predates
+        // 0x03 still reads capabilities and key out of a payload carrying one.
+        val withFutureField = AuthenticatedPeerState(
+            PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA,
+            signingKey,
+            512
+        ).encode() + byteArrayOf(0x7E, 0x01, 0x09)
+
+        val decoded = AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(withFutureField)
+        assertEquals(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, decoded?.capabilities)
+        assertEquals(512, decoded?.maxReassemblyFragments)
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `decoder rejects an unreadable ceiling rather than ignoring it`() {
+        val prefix = byteArrayOf(0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x20) + signingKey
+        val ceiling = byteArrayOf(0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00)
+        val invalid = listOf(
+            // Zero reassembles nothing — never a value to honour.
+            prefix + byteArrayOf(0x03, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00),
+            // Wrong width is a different encoding, not this one.
+            prefix + byteArrayOf(0x03, 0x01, 0x01),
+            prefix + byteArrayOf(0x03, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00),
+            // Two ceilings are ambiguous; picking either is a guess.
+            prefix + ceiling + ceiling
+        )
+
+        invalid.forEach {
+            assertNull("Expected rejection for ${it.joinToString()}", AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(it))
+        }
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `the advertised ceiling is the bound the reassembler actually enforces`() {
+        // The whole point of the field: a sender must be told the number
+        // FragmentManager rejects above, not one chosen separately from it.
+        // Asserted against `local()`, which is what the mesh services send —
+        // so dropping the ceiling from the advertisement fails here.
+        val local = AuthenticatedPeerState.local(signingKey)
+
+        assertEquals(PeerCapabilities.LOCAL_SUPPORTED, local.capabilities)
+        assertEquals(
+            AppConstants.Fragmentation.MAX_FRAGMENTS_PER_ID,
+            local.maxReassemblyFragments
+        )
+        assertEquals(
+            local,
+            AuthenticatedPeerState.decode(local.encode())
+        )
+        assertTrue(
+            "The ceiling has to fit the two-byte wire field",
+            AppConstants.Fragmentation.MAX_FRAGMENTS_PER_ID in 1..0xFFFF
+        )
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    fun `a ceiling outside the wire field is refused at construction`() {
+        listOf(0, -1, 0x10000).forEach { invalid ->
+            try {
+                AuthenticatedPeerState(PeerCapabilities.PRIVATE_MEDIA, signingKey, invalid)
+                fail("Expected rejection for ceiling $invalid")
+            } catch (expected: IllegalArgumentException) {
+                // Encoding it would truncate, or advertise a peer that
+                // reassembles nothing; both are worse than not advertising.
+            }
+        }
+    }
 }