mirror of
https://github.com/permissionlesstech/bitchat.git
synced 2026-11-15 08:12:23 +00:00
Honour a negotiated ceiling when planning private media
Advertise our own reassembler's bound in authenticated peer state, keep each peer's advertised bound pinned to the generation that stated it, and size outbound transfers against it. Two behaviour changes fall out of this: The preflight no longer only inspects directed `fileTransfer`. An advertised ceiling constrains encrypted media too, and a small reassembler behind the 0x20 path is exactly the case the type proxy cannot see. Peers that advertise nothing keep the old classification, so released clients are unaffected. The rejection message carries the real limit instead of a hardcoded 256, which is no longer always the number in force. The existing key keeps every locale's translation with only the numeral parameterized. Retires TODO(#1434).
This commit is contained in:
parent
a4581ff1d6
commit
53dda159f4
@ -16184,187 +16184,187 @@
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}
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},
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"content.delivery.reason.private_media_too_many_fragments" : {
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"comment" : "Failure reason when private media exceeds the Android-compatible fragment limit",
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"comment" : "Failure reason when private media exceeds the recipient's fragment limit; %lld is that limit",
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"extractionState" : "manual",
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"localizations" : {
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"ar" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "الملف كبير جدًا على تطبيق جهة الاتصال هذه (أكثر من 256 جزءًا عبر الشبكة المتداخلة)"
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"value" : "الملف كبير جدًا على تطبيق جهة الاتصال هذه (أكثر من %lld جزءًا عبر الشبكة المتداخلة)"
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}
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},
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"bn" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "এই কন্টাক্টের ক্লায়েন্টের জন্য ফাইলটি খুব বড় (256টির বেশি মেশ ফ্র্যাগমেন্ট)"
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"value" : "এই কন্টাক্টের ক্লায়েন্টের জন্য ফাইলটি খুব বড় (%lldটির বেশি মেশ ফ্র্যাগমেন্ট)"
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}
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},
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"de" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Datei ist zu groß für den Client dieses Kontakts (mehr als 256 Mesh-Fragmente)"
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"value" : "Datei ist zu groß für den Client dieses Kontakts (mehr als %lld Mesh-Fragmente)"
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}
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},
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"en" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "File is too large for this contact's client (more than 256 mesh fragments)"
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"value" : "File is too large for this contact's client (more than %lld mesh fragments)"
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}
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},
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"es" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "El archivo es demasiado grande para el cliente de este contacto (más de 256 fragmentos de malla)"
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"value" : "El archivo es demasiado grande para el cliente de este contacto (más de %lld fragmentos de malla)"
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}
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},
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"fa" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "فایل برای کلاینت این مخاطب خیلی بزرگ است (بیش از 256 قطعهٔ مش)"
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"value" : "فایل برای کلاینت این مخاطب خیلی بزرگ است (بیش از %lld قطعهٔ مش)"
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}
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},
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"fil" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Masyadong malaki ang file para sa client ng contact na ito (mahigit 256 mesh fragment)"
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"value" : "Masyadong malaki ang file para sa client ng contact na ito (mahigit %lld mesh fragment)"
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}
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},
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"fr" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Le fichier est trop volumineux pour le client de ce contact (plus de 256 fragments mesh)"
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"value" : "Le fichier est trop volumineux pour le client de ce contact (plus de %lld fragments mesh)"
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}
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},
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"he" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "הקובץ גדול מדי עבור הקליינט של איש הקשר הזה (יותר מ-256 מקטעי mesh)"
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"value" : "הקובץ גדול מדי עבור הקליינט של איש הקשר הזה (יותר מ-%lld מקטעי mesh)"
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}
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},
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"hi" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "यह फ़ाइल इस संपर्क के क्लाइंट के लिए बहुत बड़ी है (256 से ज़्यादा मेश फ़्रैगमेंट)"
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"value" : "यह फ़ाइल इस संपर्क के क्लाइंट के लिए बहुत बड़ी है (%lld से ज़्यादा मेश फ़्रैगमेंट)"
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}
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},
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"id" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "File terlalu besar untuk klien kontak ini (lebih dari 256 fragmen mesh)"
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"value" : "File terlalu besar untuk klien kontak ini (lebih dari %lld fragmen mesh)"
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}
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},
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"it" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Il file è troppo grande per il client di questo contatto (più di 256 frammenti mesh)"
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"value" : "Il file è troppo grande per il client di questo contatto (più di %lld frammenti mesh)"
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}
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},
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"ja" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "このファイルはこの連絡先のクライアントには大きすぎます(メッシュフラグメントが256個を超えています)"
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"value" : "このファイルはこの連絡先のクライアントには大きすぎます(メッシュフラグメントが%lld個を超えています)"
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}
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},
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"ko" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "이 연락처의 클라이언트에는 파일이 너무 커요(메시 조각 256개 초과)"
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"value" : "이 연락처의 클라이언트에는 파일이 너무 커요(메시 조각 %lld개 초과)"
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}
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},
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"ms" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Fail terlalu besar untuk klien kenalan ini (lebih daripada 256 fragmen mesh)"
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"value" : "Fail terlalu besar untuk klien kenalan ini (lebih daripada %lld fragmen mesh)"
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}
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},
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"ne" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "यो सम्पर्कको क्लाइन्टका लागि फाइल धेरै ठूलो छ (256 भन्दा बढी मेश खण्डहरू)"
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"value" : "यो सम्पर्कको क्लाइन्टका लागि फाइल धेरै ठूलो छ (%lld भन्दा बढी मेश खण्डहरू)"
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}
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},
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"nl" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Het bestand is te groot voor de client van dit contact (meer dan 256 mesh-fragmenten)"
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"value" : "Het bestand is te groot voor de client van dit contact (meer dan %lld mesh-fragmenten)"
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}
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},
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"pl" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Plik jest za duży dla klienta tego kontaktu (ponad 256 fragmentów mesh)"
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"value" : "Plik jest za duży dla klienta tego kontaktu (ponad %lld fragmentów mesh)"
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}
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},
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"pt" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "O ficheiro é demasiado grande para o cliente deste contacto (mais de 256 fragmentos da malha)"
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"value" : "O ficheiro é demasiado grande para o cliente deste contacto (mais de %lld fragmentos da malha)"
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}
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},
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"pt-BR" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "O arquivo é grande demais para o cliente deste contato (mais de 256 fragmentos da malha)"
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"value" : "O arquivo é grande demais para o cliente deste contato (mais de %lld fragmentos da malha)"
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}
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},
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"ru" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Файл слишком большой для клиента этого контакта (больше 256 фрагментов mesh-сети)"
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"value" : "Файл слишком большой для клиента этого контакта (больше %lld фрагментов mesh-сети)"
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}
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},
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"sv" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Filen är för stor för den här kontaktens klient (fler än 256 mesh-fragment)"
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"value" : "Filen är för stor för den här kontaktens klient (fler än %lld mesh-fragment)"
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}
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},
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"ta" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "இந்தத் தொடர்பின் கிளையண்டுக்கு இந்தக் கோப்பு மிகப் பெரியது (256-க்கும் மேற்பட்ட மெஷ் துண்டுகள்)"
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"value" : "இந்தத் தொடர்பின் கிளையண்டுக்கு இந்தக் கோப்பு மிகப் பெரியது (%lld-க்கும் மேற்பட்ட மெஷ் துண்டுகள்)"
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}
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},
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"th" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "ไฟล์ใหญ่เกินไปสำหรับไคลเอ็นต์ของผู้ติดต่อรายนี้ (เกิน 256 ส่วนย่อยของ mesh)"
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"value" : "ไฟล์ใหญ่เกินไปสำหรับไคลเอ็นต์ของผู้ติดต่อรายนี้ (เกิน %lld ส่วนย่อยของ mesh)"
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}
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},
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"tr" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Dosya bu kişinin istemcisi için çok büyük (256'dan fazla mesh parçası)"
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"value" : "Dosya bu kişinin istemcisi için çok büyük (mesh parça sınırı: %lld)"
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}
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},
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"uk" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Файл завеликий для клієнта цього контакту (понад 256 фрагментів mesh-мережі)"
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"value" : "Файл завеликий для клієнта цього контакту (понад %lld фрагментів mesh-мережі)"
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}
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},
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"ur" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "یہ فائل اس رابطے کے کلائنٹ کے لیے بہت بڑی ہے (256 سے زیادہ میش ٹکڑے)"
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"value" : "یہ فائل اس رابطے کے کلائنٹ کے لیے بہت بڑی ہے (%lld سے زیادہ میش ٹکڑے)"
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}
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},
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"vi" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "Tệp quá lớn so với ứng dụng của liên hệ này (hơn 256 phân mảnh mesh)"
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"value" : "Tệp quá lớn so với ứng dụng của liên hệ này (hơn %lld phân mảnh mesh)"
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}
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},
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"zh-Hans" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "文件太大,这位联系人的客户端无法接收(超过 256 个网状网络分片)"
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"value" : "文件太大,这位联系人的客户端无法接收(超过 %lld 个网状网络分片)"
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}
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},
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"zh-Hant" : {
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"stringUnit" : {
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"state" : "translated",
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"value" : "檔案太大,這位聯絡人的用戶端無法接收(超過 256 個網狀網路分段)"
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"value" : "檔案太大,這位聯絡人的用戶端無法接收(超過 %lld 個網狀網路分段)"
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}
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}
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}
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@ -5,6 +5,22 @@ struct BLEAuthenticatedPeerStateObservation {
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let fingerprint: String
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let sessionGeneration: UUID
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let capabilities: PeerCapabilities
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/// The peer's own reassembly bound, if it advertised one. Bound to the
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/// generation like every other field here: a replacement session must
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/// re-state its ceiling rather than inherit the previous one.
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let maxReassemblyFragments: UInt16?
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init(
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fingerprint: String,
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sessionGeneration: UUID,
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capabilities: PeerCapabilities,
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maxReassemblyFragments: UInt16? = nil
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) {
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self.fingerprint = fingerprint
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self.sessionGeneration = sessionGeneration
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self.capabilities = capabilities
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self.maxReassemblyFragments = maxReassemblyFragments
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}
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}
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struct BLEPrivateMediaProofTimeoutMarker {
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@ -163,14 +179,16 @@ final class BLEPrivateMediaSessionStore: @unchecked Sendable {
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for peerID: PeerID,
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fingerprint: String,
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generation: UUID,
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capabilities: PeerCapabilities
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capabilities: PeerCapabilities,
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maxReassemblyFragments: UInt16? = nil
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) -> [@MainActor (PrivateMediaSendPolicy) -> Void]? {
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lock.withLock {
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guard sessionGenerations[peerID] == generation else { return nil }
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authenticatedStates[peerID] = BLEAuthenticatedPeerStateObservation(
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fingerprint: fingerprint,
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sessionGeneration: generation,
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capabilities: capabilities
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capabilities: capabilities,
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maxReassemblyFragments: maxReassemblyFragments
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)
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proofTimeoutMarkers.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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proofWatchdogs.removeValue(forKey: peerID)
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@ -347,6 +365,22 @@ final class BLEPrivateMediaSessionStore: @unchecked Sendable {
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}
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extension BLEPrivateMediaSessionStore {
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/// The recipient's advertised reassembly ceiling, or nil when it did not
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/// advertise one.
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///
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/// Only honoured for an observation pinned to the peer's *current*
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/// generation. A ceiling read off a superseded session is a statement by
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/// whoever held that session, and after a rekey the counterpart may be a
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/// different client entirely — falling back to the type proxy is the
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/// conservative answer, not reusing a stale number.
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func negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for peerID: PeerID) -> UInt16? {
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let inputs = policyInputs(for: peerID)
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guard let generation = inputs.sessionGeneration,
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let authenticated = inputs.authenticatedState,
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authenticated.sessionGeneration == generation else { return nil }
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return authenticated.maxReassemblyFragments
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}
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/// The current generation iff its authenticated peer state proved the
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/// private-media capability (and, when required, durable receipts).
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func provenGeneration(for peerID: PeerID, requireReceipts: Bool) -> UUID? {
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@ -2009,13 +2009,19 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
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// unaffected. Run the same planner the scheduler will use, after route
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// application, and reject before reserving a transfer slot or writing
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// any fragment.
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// TODO(#1434): negotiate an explicit per-peer fragment limit so a future
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// Android client that adopts the encrypted 0x20 path but still caps its
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// reassembler can advertise its own ceiling instead of relying on the
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// capability/type proxy above.
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// The proxy above is now only the fallback: a peer that advertised its
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// own ceiling in authenticated `0x21` state has it honoured instead,
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// which is what closes #1434. That also means the check can no longer
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// be restricted to `fileTransfer` — an advertised ceiling constrains
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// encrypted media too, and that is precisely the case (small
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// reassembler behind the `0x20` path) the type proxy misses.
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if let transferId,
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let recipientPeerID = PeerID(hexData: packetToSend.recipientID),
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packetToSend.type == MessageType.fileTransfer.rawValue {
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let recipientPeerID = PeerID(hexData: packetToSend.recipientID) {
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let ceiling = BLEFragmentCeilingPolicy.decide(
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packetType: packetToSend.type,
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isDirectedToPeer: true,
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negotiatedCeiling: privateMediaSessions.negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for: recipientPeerID.toShort())
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)
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let compatibilityRequest = BLEOutboundFragmentTransferRequest(
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packet: packetToSend,
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pad: padForBLE,
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@ -2027,17 +2033,20 @@ final class BLEService: NSObject {
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for: compatibilityRequest,
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defaultChunkSize: defaultFragmentSize,
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bleMaxMTU: bleMaxMTU
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), BLEOutboundFragmentPlanner.isPrivateMediaV1Compatible(plan) else {
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), ceiling.admits(fragmentCount: plan.totalFragments) else {
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SecureLogger.warning(
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"Private media rejected: exceeds cross-platform 256-fragment limit",
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"Private media rejected: \(String(describing: ceiling.source)) limit of \(ceiling.maxFragments) fragments",
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category: .security
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)
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TransferProgressManager.shared.rejectBeforeStart(
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id: transferId,
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reason: String(
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localized: "content.delivery.reason.private_media_too_many_fragments",
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defaultValue: "File is too large for this contact's client (more than 256 mesh fragments)",
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comment: "Failure reason when private media exceeds the Android-compatible fragment limit"
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format: String(
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localized: "content.delivery.reason.private_media_too_many_fragments",
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defaultValue: "File is too large for this contact's client (more than %lld mesh fragments)",
|
||||
comment: "Failure reason when private media exceeds the recipient's fragment limit; %lld is that limit"
|
||||
),
|
||||
ceiling.maxFragments
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if requiresPrivateMediaAdmission {
|
||||
@ -4234,7 +4243,12 @@ extension BLEService {
|
||||
let capabilities = localIdentityState.snapshot().advertisedCapabilities
|
||||
let state = AuthenticatedPeerStatePacket(
|
||||
capabilities: capabilities,
|
||||
signingPublicKey: noiseService.getSigningPublicKeyData()
|
||||
signingPublicKey: noiseService.getSigningPublicKeyData(),
|
||||
// Our own reassembler's bound, so a peer sizing a transfer for us
|
||||
// does not have to infer it from the packet type either.
|
||||
maxReassemblyFragments: UInt16(
|
||||
clamping: BLEFragmentAssemblyBuffer.maxReassemblyFragments
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
guard let payload = BLENoisePayloadFactory.authenticatedPeerState(state) else {
|
||||
SecureLogger.error("Failed to encode authenticated peer state", category: .security)
|
||||
@ -4308,7 +4322,8 @@ extension BLEService {
|
||||
for: normalizedPeerID,
|
||||
fingerprint: fingerprint,
|
||||
generation: generation,
|
||||
capabilities: state.capabilities
|
||||
capabilities: state.capabilities,
|
||||
maxReassemblyFragments: state.maxReassemblyFragments
|
||||
) else {
|
||||
return (false, [])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ struct BLEFragmentCeilingPolicyTests {
|
||||
fileTransfer,
|
||||
noiseEncrypted,
|
||||
MessageType.message.rawValue,
|
||||
MessageType.announce.rawValue,
|
||||
MessageType.announce.rawValue
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
for ceiling in ceilings {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -189,4 +189,73 @@ struct BLEPrivateMediaSessionStoreTests {
|
||||
)
|
||||
#expect(store.markPeerStateSend(for: peer, echo: false))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// MARK: - Negotiated reassembly ceiling
|
||||
|
||||
@Test func negotiatedCeilingIsReadableOnlyForTheGenerationThatStatedIt() {
|
||||
let store = BLEPrivateMediaSessionStore()
|
||||
let generation = UUID()
|
||||
_ = store.beginAuthenticatedGeneration(
|
||||
for: peer, fingerprint: fingerprint, generation: generation
|
||||
)
|
||||
#expect(store.negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for: peer) == nil)
|
||||
|
||||
_ = store.applyAuthenticatedPeerState(
|
||||
for: peer,
|
||||
fingerprint: fingerprint,
|
||||
generation: generation,
|
||||
capabilities: [.privateMedia],
|
||||
maxReassemblyFragments: 128
|
||||
)
|
||||
#expect(store.negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for: peer) == 128)
|
||||
|
||||
// A rekey replaces the counterpart's session state. The old ceiling
|
||||
// was a statement by whoever held that session, and the replacement
|
||||
// may be a different client entirely, so it must not be inherited.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Two independent mechanisms enforce this: `beginAuthenticatedGeneration`
|
||||
// drops the observation, and the accessor refuses one whose pinned
|
||||
// generation is not current. Removing either alone still passes; this
|
||||
// expectation fails once both are gone, which is the invariant it is
|
||||
// here to hold rather than any single line of it.
|
||||
_ = store.beginAuthenticatedGeneration(
|
||||
for: peer, fingerprint: fingerprint, generation: UUID()
|
||||
)
|
||||
#expect(store.negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for: peer) == nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test func peerStateWithoutACeilingLeavesTheSenderOnTheTypeProxy() {
|
||||
let store = BLEPrivateMediaSessionStore()
|
||||
let generation = UUID()
|
||||
_ = store.beginAuthenticatedGeneration(
|
||||
for: peer, fingerprint: fingerprint, generation: generation
|
||||
)
|
||||
// Every client released before TLV 0x03 lands here.
|
||||
_ = store.applyAuthenticatedPeerState(
|
||||
for: peer,
|
||||
fingerprint: fingerprint,
|
||||
generation: generation,
|
||||
capabilities: [.privateMedia]
|
||||
)
|
||||
#expect(store.negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for: peer) == nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test func clearingTheSessionDropsTheNegotiatedCeiling() {
|
||||
let store = BLEPrivateMediaSessionStore()
|
||||
let generation = UUID()
|
||||
_ = store.beginAuthenticatedGeneration(
|
||||
for: peer, fingerprint: fingerprint, generation: generation
|
||||
)
|
||||
_ = store.applyAuthenticatedPeerState(
|
||||
for: peer,
|
||||
fingerprint: fingerprint,
|
||||
generation: generation,
|
||||
capabilities: [.privateMedia],
|
||||
maxReassemblyFragments: 512
|
||||
)
|
||||
#expect(store.negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for: peer) == 512)
|
||||
|
||||
_ = store.clearSession(for: peer)
|
||||
#expect(store.negotiatedFragmentCeiling(for: peer) == nil)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user