bitchat/bitchatTests/EndToEnd/CourierEndToEndTests.swift
jack c6b7096b2f
BLE transport architecture V3: one engine domain, capability ports, feature-owned state (#1498)
* Make peer registry and local announce state lock-backed

The main actor answered isPeerConnected/peerNickname/currentPeerSnapshots
and flipped runtime capability bits by blocking on collectionsQueue behind
whatever transport work was in flight. Peer state now lives in a
lock-backed BLEPeerRegistryStore (every registry mutation is a single
whole-transition method, so readers never observe a torn state), and the
runtime capability bits move into BLELocalIdentityStateStore next to the
identity they ride announces with. No transport entry point called from
the main actor blocks on a transport queue for peer state anymore.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Move BLE link egress/ingress buffers to bleQueue ownership

pendingPeripheralWrites, pendingNotifications, and pendingWriteBuffers
were collectionsQueue-guarded, but every producer and drain already runs
on bleQueue next to the CoreBluetooth objects they feed — each access
paid a cross-queue barrier for state that never leaves the radio thread,
and the notification drain even invoked peripheralManager.updateValue
from the collections queue. They are now bleQueue-confined like the link
state store: CB delegate callbacks and drains touch them directly, and
the few engine-side entry points hop to bleQueue (the direction the
transport's sync-edge order already allows). This clears most
bleQueue-to-collectionsQueue sync edges ahead of merging the collections
queue into the message queue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Stop bleQueue maintenance and status paths from blocking on collectionsQueue

The traffic-burst tracker becomes a lock-backed monitor (written by the
receive pipeline, read by scan-duty adaptation and announce pacing on
bleQueue), the status-log peer summary and topology refresh read the
already lock-backed registry directly, and the stalled-fragment reap
moves to an async collections hop with the gossip resync request inside
it. bleQueue no longer sync-waits on the collections queue anywhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Unify the message and collections queues into one serial engine queue

The old model ran a concurrent message queue over a second concurrent
collections queue whose barrier flags served as the real mutual
exclusion — every field carried an ownership comment, and correctness
lived in per-site discipline. The message queue is now a single serial
engine queue that owns all mesh protocol state; the collections queue,
its 98 sync/async hops, and every barrier flag are gone. Cross-thread
callers go through onEngine, which documents and (in debug) enforces
the transport's sync-edge order: main and test threads may block on the
engine, the engine may block on bleQueue and the crypto/identity
queues, and nothing may block the other way.

The debug trap caught two latent inversions the leaf-lock structure had
been masking: the verified-announce rebind path re-resolved the ingress
link through the engine from inside its bleQueue critical section (it
now receives the already-resolved link), and the noise
session-generation closures sync-re-entered the engine from the noise
manager's queue while their own engine slot was blocked on it (they now
touch engine state directly, which the held slot makes exclusive).

BLE throughput is orders of magnitude below what one serial queue
sustains; the full suite runs at identical speed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Wire gateway/bridge/panic features to capability ports, not BLEService

App wiring discovered mesh-only features by casting the Transport to
the concrete BLEService class in nine places. Those surfaces are now
three capability protocols — BluetoothStateReporting,
PanicResettingTransport, and MeshBridgingTransport — discovered with
as? like any optional capability, so the bootstrapper, panic flow, and
lifecycle coordinator no longer name the concrete transport at all. A
future second mesh transport picks up gateway/bridge wiring and the
panic lifecycle by conforming, and the remaining Transport god-protocol
requirements can migrate to the same pattern.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Extract mesh-ping diagnostics state into a pure engine-confined tracker

First slice of the feature-module direction: BLEMeshPingTracker owns the
outstanding-probe map and the per-link inbound response budget as pure
state (register/resolve/expire/reset), so the security invariants — a
pong only resolves against the probed peer, the budget keys on the
ingress link because claimed senders are forgeable, panic reset drops
probes and budget together — are now unit-tested without queues or
radios. The transport keeps only packet I/O, timers, and main-actor
delivery around it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Document the V3 transport architecture and remaining roadmap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Resolve the pass-6 review findings and the proof-timeout drain defect

Periphery: the registry store's unused forwarders are gone (the struct
method stays — it has direct tests). F1: refreshPeerIdentity,
deliverBridgedEnvelope, and the three panic fences route through
onEngine, so every sync entry onto the engine now carries the bleQueue
trap. F2: the registry-store ownership comments state the real writer
set (engine plus the two bleQueue link-drop paths). F7:
BLEQueueContractTests pins the contract — only onEngine may sync-enter
the engine, transport code never sync-dispatches to main, and the
collections queue stays deleted — with a queue-contract-ok waiver for
the two sanctioned lines.

The real defect behind the timeoutRestoredSession CI flake: a
timeout-restore parks the outbound queues until the convergence retry,
but the capability-proof watchdog armed at the original authentication
kept draining them when it fired — encrypting the parked traffic under
restored keys the counterpart may have discarded, the exact silent loss
the defer path exists to prevent. Deferred peers are now tracked and
the watchdog drain respects the same rule; the test fires the watchdog
deterministically inside the deferred window instead of losing that
race only on stalled runners.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Extract private-media session state into a lock-backed store

The six generation-keyed maps plus the convergence-deferral set move
out of BLEService into BLEPrivateMediaSessionStore, each transition one
whole method under a leaf lock with direct unit tests (generation
rotation rejects mismatched waiters, stale proofs cannot classify a
replacement session, expiry requires the live deadline identity, clears
rebase waiters onto a nil-generation deadline, peer-state sends are
once per generation per kind).

Being a leaf lock also simplifies two contracts: the send policy is now
answered entirely from locks (the main actor no longer sync-enters the
engine for it), and the noise-manager critical sections call ordinary
store methods instead of relying on the held-engine-slot direct-access
subtlety.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Split the mesh-only Transport surface into capability protocols

Transport kept ~50 requirements that only the BLE mesh implements —
files/private media, voice, courier, groups, board, diagnostics,
verification, archive — held together by an extension of inert
defaults, so every call site compiled against a surface most transports
faked. Those are now eight capability protocols (MeshFileTransferring,
MeshVoiceStreaming, MeshCourierTransporting, MeshGroupMessaging,
MeshBoardBroadcasting, MeshDiagnosing, MeshVerifying,
MeshPublicArchiving) discovered with as?, joining the bridging/panic
ports from the previous pass. Consumers resolve the capability they
need; where the old defaults encoded a safe floor the caller keeps it
explicitly (private-media policy degrades to blockedDowngrade). The
inert-defaults extension is deleted, along with the never-implemented
acceptPendingFile/declinePendingFile pair. NostrTransport is untouched
— it only ever implemented the core.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update the V3 doc for the completed feature-peeling and Transport split

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Drop the dead three-argument sendFilePrivate overload

Every production caller goes through the allowLegacyFallback variant;
the short form only existed as a Transport-era forwarding default.
Tests that used it on the concrete service now state the fallback
decision explicitly, which is the point of the parameter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Decide the link-auth boundary: bindings become engine-owned

The atomicity that keeps link-auth on bleQueue exists to stop a binding
from changing between a security check and its action; once every
rebind is an engine operation, the engine's serial slot gives the same
guarantee, the stolen-link residual is unchanged (directed payloads are
Noise ciphertext), and the receive path lands in its sans-I/O shape —
the link layer reports bytes-plus-linkID and the engine resolves the
sender. Records the extraction order too: the binding-free radio half
first (after #1521 lands — it collides in the scanPlan region), then
bindings, then the delegates behind the port.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix two bleQueue-to-engine sync edges the queue merge created

The collections-to-engine conversion turned two formerly leaf-lock
sync calls into onEngine calls reachable from bleQueue, where the
debug trap (correctly) aborts: flushDirectedSpool runs from bleQueue
maintenance and now hops to the engine asynchronously, and ingress
recording — which must answer the duplicate gate on bleQueue the
moment a frame decodes — moves to a lock-backed BLEIngressLinkStore
read by the engine's relay and routing decisions.

Unit suites never hit either path (no CoreBluetooth managers means no
maintenance timer and no live receive path); the iOS simulator job
boots the real app as its test host, which is exactly where the
maintenance trap fired. The ingress one would have trapped a real
device on its first received packet — worth a device pass before
release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Route all deferred engine work through an injectable scheduler

Relay jitter, announce delays, the ping and capability-proof deadlines,
notification retry backoff, and fragment pacing all reached the engine
through raw messageQueue.asyncAfter with product constants as deadlines
— the hidden-elapsed-deadline flake class that the test-timing hygiene
rules exist to contain, testable only by racing the wall clock.
BLEEngineScheduling is now the transport's single source of engine
delay: production is a thin veneer over the engine queue, tests inject
a manually advanced clock whose advance() returns only after the
released work has finished on the engine. The queue-contract test pins
the seam (no raw messageQueue.asyncAfter), and the ping deadline gets
the pattern's proof: the real 10s constant asserted in milliseconds —
must not fire early, fires exactly once at the deadline, stays consumed
after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Assert the armed deadline count in the injected-clock ping test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 16:03:20 +01:00

922 lines
40 KiB
Swift

//
// CourierEndToEndTests.swift
// bitchat
//
// This is free and unencumbered software released into the public domain.
// For more information, see <https://unlicense.org>
//
import Testing
import Foundation
import Combine
import CoreBluetooth
import BitFoundation
@testable import bitchat
/// Three-node courier flow exercised through real BLEService instances with
/// packets ferried in-process: Alice deposits a sealed envelope with Carol
/// while Bob is unreachable; Carol hands it over when Bob announces; Bob
/// opens it and sees Alice's message in the right DM thread.
struct CourierEndToEndTests {
// MARK: - Helpers
private final class PacketTap {
private let lock = NSLock()
private var packets: [BitchatPacket] = []
func record(_ packet: BitchatPacket) {
lock.lock(); packets.append(packet); lock.unlock()
}
func first(ofType type: MessageType) -> BitchatPacket? {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return packets.first { $0.type == type.rawValue }
}
func count(ofType type: MessageType) -> Int {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }.count
}
func all(ofType type: MessageType) -> [BitchatPacket] {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return packets.filter { $0.type == type.rawValue }
}
}
private final class NoiseCaptureDelegate: BitchatDelegate {
private let lock = NSLock()
private var payloads: [(peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data)] = []
func didReceiveNoisePayload(from peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data, timestamp: Date) {
lock.lock(); payloads.append((peerID, type, payload)); lock.unlock()
}
func snapshot() -> [(peerID: PeerID, type: NoisePayloadType, payload: Data)] {
lock.lock(); defer { lock.unlock() }
return payloads
}
// Unused BitchatDelegate requirements.
func didReceiveMessage(_ message: BitchatMessage) {}
func didConnectToPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didDisconnectFromPeer(_ peerID: PeerID) {}
func didUpdatePeerList(_ peers: [PeerID]) {}
func didUpdateBluetoothState(_ state: CBManagerState) {}
func didReceivePublicMessage(from peerID: PeerID, nickname: String, content: String, timestamp: Date, messageID: String?) {}
}
private func makeService(identityManager: MockIdentityManager? = nil) -> BLEService {
let keychain = MockKeychain()
let identityManager = identityManager ?? MockIdentityManager(keychain)
let idBridge = NostrIdentityBridge(keychain: MockKeychainHelper())
let service = BLEService(
keychain: keychain,
idBridge: idBridge,
identityManager: identityManager,
initializeBluetoothManagers: false
)
service.courierStore = CourierStore(persistsToDisk: false)
return service
}
/// Handling any packet from a peer preseeds it as a connected,
/// verified entry in the receiving service's registry.
private func preseedConnectedPeer(_ peer: BLEService, in service: BLEService) {
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.message.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: peer.myPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: Data("ping".utf8),
signature: nil,
ttl: 1
)
service._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: peer.myPeerID)
}
/// Establishes the Noise session that proves the direct link's peer owns
/// its announced static identity. CoreBluetooth is disabled in this suite,
/// so the handshake is ferried in-process just like courier packets.
private func establishNoiseSession(between initiator: BLEService, and responder: BLEService) throws {
let message1 = try initiator._test_noiseInitiateHandshake(with: responder.myPeerID)
let message2 = try #require(
try responder._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(from: initiator.myPeerID, message: message1)
)
let message3 = try #require(
try initiator._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(from: responder.myPeerID, message: message2)
)
_ = try responder._test_noiseProcessHandshakeMessage(from: initiator.myPeerID, message: message3)
}
// MARK: - Tests
@Test func courierCarriesMessageAcrossDisjointConnectivity() async throws {
let alice = makeService()
let carol = makeService()
let bob = makeService()
// Alice and Carol are mutual favorites; trust policy is exercised
// separately in depositFromUntrustedPeerIsRejected.
carol.courierDepositPolicy = { _, _ in .favorite }
let bobDelegate = NoiseCaptureDelegate()
bob.delegate = bobDelegate
let aliceOut = PacketTap()
alice._test_onOutboundPacket = aliceOut.record
let carolOut = PacketTap()
carol._test_onOutboundPacket = carolOut.record
let bobOut = PacketTap()
bob._test_onOutboundPacket = bobOut.record
// Alice can see Carol; Bob is nowhere on the mesh.
preseedConnectedPeer(carol, in: alice)
// 1. Alice seals to Bob's static key and deposits with Carol.
#expect(alice.sendCourierMessage(
"the camp moved north",
messageID: "courier-msg-1",
recipientNoiseKey: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData(),
via: [carol.myPeerID]
))
let deposited = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(deposited)
let depositPacket = try #require(aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope))
// 2. Ferry the deposit to Carol; she carries it (opaque to her).
carol._test_handlePacket(depositPacket, fromPeerID: alice.myPeerID, signingPublicKey: alice.noiseSigningPublicKeyData())
let carried = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !carol.courierStore.isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(carried)
// 3. Later, Bob proves link ownership and announces near Carol
// handover fires.
try establishNoiseSession(between: carol, and: bob)
bob.sendBroadcastAnnounce()
let announced = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ bobOut.first(ofType: .announce) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(announced)
let announcePacket = try #require(bobOut.first(ofType: .announce))
carol._test_handlePacket(announcePacket, fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let handedOver = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ carolOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(handedOver)
// With CoreBluetooth disabled there is no physical link for the send
// planner to accept, so Carol truthfully retains the durable copy even
// though the packet tap lets us ferry the attempted handover below.
#expect(!carol.courierStore.isEmpty)
let handoverPacket = try #require(carolOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope))
#expect(PeerID(hexData: handoverPacket.recipientID) == bob.myPeerID)
// 4. Ferry the handover to Bob; he opens the envelope.
bob._test_handlePacket(handoverPacket, fromPeerID: carol.myPeerID)
let received = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !bobDelegate.snapshot().isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(received)
let delivered = try #require(bobDelegate.snapshot().first)
#expect(delivered.type == .privateMessage)
// Alice is absent from Bob's mesh, so the sender resolves to her
// full noise-key ID the stable favorite conversation not the
// short mesh ID (which Bob couldn't resolve to a nickname) and not
// the courier's identity.
#expect(delivered.peerID == PeerID(hexData: alice.noiseStaticPublicKeyData()))
#expect(delivered.peerID != carol.myPeerID)
let message = try #require(PrivateMessagePacket.decode(from: delivered.payload))
#expect(message.messageID == "courier-msg-1")
#expect(message.content == "the camp moved north")
}
@Test func courieredMailFromBlockedSenderIsDropped() async throws {
let alice = makeService()
let carol = makeService()
let bobIdentity = MockIdentityManager(MockKeychain())
let bob = makeService(identityManager: bobIdentity)
carol.courierDepositPolicy = { _, _ in .favorite }
let bobDelegate = NoiseCaptureDelegate()
bob.delegate = bobDelegate
let aliceOut = PacketTap()
alice._test_onOutboundPacket = aliceOut.record
let carolOut = PacketTap()
carol._test_onOutboundPacket = carolOut.record
let bobOut = PacketTap()
bob._test_onOutboundPacket = bobOut.record
preseedConnectedPeer(carol, in: alice)
// Bob blocked Alice by her stable Noise identity while she was away.
bobIdentity.setBlocked(alice.noiseStaticPublicKeyData().sha256Fingerprint(), isBlocked: true)
#expect(alice.sendCourierMessage(
"you should not see this",
messageID: "courier-msg-blocked-sender",
recipientNoiseKey: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData(),
via: [carol.myPeerID]
))
let deposited = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(deposited)
let depositPacket = try #require(aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope))
carol._test_handlePacket(depositPacket, fromPeerID: alice.myPeerID, signingPublicKey: alice.noiseSigningPublicKeyData())
let carried = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !carol.courierStore.isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(carried)
try establishNoiseSession(between: carol, and: bob)
bob.sendBroadcastAnnounce()
let announced = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ bobOut.first(ofType: .announce) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(announced)
let announcePacket = try #require(bobOut.first(ofType: .announce))
carol._test_handlePacket(announcePacket, fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let handedOver = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ carolOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(handedOver)
let handoverPacket = try #require(carolOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope))
// Bob opens the envelope but the sealed sender is blocked, and it
// must never reach the UI. The live block check can't cover this: the
// sender is absent from Bob's registry, so no fingerprint resolves at
// delivery time.
bob._test_handlePacket(handoverPacket, fromPeerID: carol.myPeerID)
let delivered = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !bobDelegate.snapshot().isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!delivered)
}
@Test func unverifiedAnnounceDoesNotTriggerCourierHandover() async throws {
let alice = makeService()
let carol = makeService()
let bob = makeService()
carol.courierDepositPolicy = { _, _ in .favorite }
let aliceOut = PacketTap()
alice._test_onOutboundPacket = aliceOut.record
let carolOut = PacketTap()
carol._test_onOutboundPacket = carolOut.record
let bobOut = PacketTap()
bob._test_onOutboundPacket = bobOut.record
preseedConnectedPeer(carol, in: alice)
#expect(alice.sendCourierMessage(
"hold until verified",
messageID: "courier-msg-unverified-announce",
recipientNoiseKey: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData(),
via: [carol.myPeerID]
))
let deposited = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(deposited)
let depositPacket = try #require(aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope))
carol._test_handlePacket(depositPacket, fromPeerID: alice.myPeerID, signingPublicKey: alice.noiseSigningPublicKeyData())
let carried = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !carol.courierStore.isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(carried)
let forgedAnnounce = try makeUnsignedAnnounce(from: bob)
carol._test_handlePacket(forgedAnnounce, fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let leakedOnUnverifiedAnnounce = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ carolOut.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) > 0 },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!leakedOnUnverifiedAnnounce)
#expect(!carol.courierStore.isEmpty)
bob.sendBroadcastAnnounce()
let announced = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ bobOut.first(ofType: .announce) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(announced)
let verifiedAnnounce = try #require(bobOut.first(ofType: .announce))
carol._test_handlePacket(verifiedAnnounce, fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let handedOver = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ carolOut.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(handedOver)
#expect(!carol.courierStore.isEmpty)
}
@Test func relayedAnnounceTriggersNonDestructiveRemoteHandover() async throws {
let alice = makeService()
let carol = makeService()
let bob = makeService()
carol.courierDepositPolicy = { _, _ in .favorite }
let aliceOut = PacketTap()
alice._test_onOutboundPacket = aliceOut.record
let carolOut = PacketTap()
carol._test_onOutboundPacket = carolOut.record
let bobOut = PacketTap()
bob._test_onOutboundPacket = bobOut.record
preseedConnectedPeer(carol, in: alice)
#expect(alice.sendCourierMessage(
"hold for a direct encounter",
messageID: "courier-msg-relayed-announce",
recipientNoiseKey: bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData(),
via: [carol.myPeerID]
))
let deposited = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(deposited)
let depositPacket = try #require(aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope))
carol._test_handlePacket(depositPacket, fromPeerID: alice.myPeerID, signingPublicKey: alice.noiseSigningPublicKeyData())
let carried = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !carol.courierStore.isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(carried)
bob.sendBroadcastAnnounce()
let announced = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ bobOut.first(ofType: .announce) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(announced)
let directAnnounce = try #require(bobOut.first(ofType: .announce))
// A relayed copy has a decremented TTL but a still-valid signature
// (TTL is excluded from announce signatures). The recipient is
// multi-hop away, so a copy floods toward them speculatively while
// the carried original stays put for a future direct encounter.
var relayedAnnounce = directAnnounce
relayedAnnounce.ttl = directAnnounce.ttl - 1
carol._test_handlePacket(relayedAnnounce, fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let remoteHandover = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ carolOut.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) == 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(remoteHandover)
#expect(!carol.courierStore.isEmpty)
// A second relayed announce inside the cooldown must not re-flood
// the same envelope. The original announce's dedup key is consumed
// (sender/timestamp/payload TTL excluded), so use a fresh announce;
// wait out the 1s announce throttle first.
try await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_100_000_000)
bob.sendBroadcastAnnounce()
let reannounced = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ bobOut.all(ofType: .announce).contains { $0.timestamp != directAnnounce.timestamp } },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(reannounced)
let freshAnnounce = try #require(
bobOut.all(ofType: .announce).first { $0.timestamp != directAnnounce.timestamp }
)
var relayedFreshAnnounce = freshAnnounce
relayedFreshAnnounce.ttl = freshAnnounce.ttl - 1
carol._test_handlePacket(relayedFreshAnnounce, fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let refloodedInCooldown = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ carolOut.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) > 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!refloodedInCooldown)
#expect(!carol.courierStore.isEmpty)
// A peer-level Noise session is still insufficient without a physical
// ingress link that completed that handshake. This CoreBluetooth-free
// harness deliberately has no such link proof, so restoring the
// unsigned direct TTL cannot authorize destructive handover.
try establishNoiseSession(between: carol, and: bob)
try await Task.sleep(nanoseconds: 1_100_000_000)
bob.sendBroadcastAnnounce()
let announcedAgain = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ bobOut.all(ofType: .announce).contains { $0.timestamp != directAnnounce.timestamp && $0.timestamp != freshAnnounce.timestamp } },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(announcedAgain)
let directAgain = try #require(
bobOut.all(ofType: .announce).first { $0.timestamp != directAnnounce.timestamp && $0.timestamp != freshAnnounce.timestamp }
)
carol._test_handlePacket(directAgain, fromPeerID: bob.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let handedOverWithoutLinkProof = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ carolOut.count(ofType: .courierEnvelope) > 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!handedOverWithoutLinkProof)
#expect(!carol.courierStore.isEmpty)
}
@Test func sendCourierMessageRejectsInvalidRecipientKeyBeforeQueueing() async throws {
let alice = makeService()
let carol = makeService()
preseedConnectedPeer(carol, in: alice)
let aliceOut = PacketTap()
alice._test_onOutboundPacket = aliceOut.record
#expect(!alice.sendCourierMessage(
"this cannot be sealed",
messageID: "courier-msg-invalid-key",
recipientNoiseKey: Data(repeating: 0x01, count: 8),
via: [carol.myPeerID]
))
let queuedPacket = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ aliceOut.first(ofType: .courierEnvelope) != nil },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!queuedPacket)
}
@Test func depositFromUntrustedPeerIsRejected() async throws {
let carol = makeService()
carol.courierDepositPolicy = { _, _ in nil } // depositor is neither favorite nor verified
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bobKey = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain()).getStaticPublicKeyData()
let typedPayload = try #require(BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateMessage(content: "x", messageID: "m1"))
let sealed = try alice.sealCourierPayload(typedPayload, recipientStaticKey: bobKey)
let now = Date()
let envelope = CourierEnvelope(
recipientTag: CourierEnvelope.recipientTag(
noiseStaticKey: bobKey,
epochDay: CourierEnvelope.epochDay(for: now)
),
expiry: UInt64((now.timeIntervalSince1970 + 3600) * 1000),
ciphertext: sealed
)
let alicePeerID = PeerID(publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
let unsigned = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.courierEnvelope.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: carol.myPeerID.id),
timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: try #require(envelope.encode()),
signature: nil,
ttl: 1
)
let packet = try #require(alice.signPacket(unsigned))
carol._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: alicePeerID, signingPublicKey: alice.getSigningPublicKeyData())
let stored = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !carol.courierStore.isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!stored)
}
@Test func unsignedDepositIsRejected() async throws {
let carol = makeService()
carol.courierDepositPolicy = { _, _ in .favorite }
let alice = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bobKey = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain()).getStaticPublicKeyData()
let typedPayload = try #require(BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateMessage(content: "x", messageID: "m-unsigned"))
let sealed = try alice.sealCourierPayload(typedPayload, recipientStaticKey: bobKey)
let now = Date()
let envelope = CourierEnvelope(
recipientTag: CourierEnvelope.recipientTag(
noiseStaticKey: bobKey,
epochDay: CourierEnvelope.epochDay(for: now)
),
expiry: UInt64((now.timeIntervalSince1970 + 3600) * 1000),
ciphertext: sealed
)
let alicePeerID = PeerID(publicKey: alice.getStaticPublicKeyData())
// Correct sender, willing policy but no packet signature: the
// courier cannot authenticate the depositor, so it must not carry.
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.courierEnvelope.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: alicePeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: carol.myPeerID.id),
timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: try #require(envelope.encode()),
signature: nil,
ttl: 1
)
carol._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: alicePeerID, signingPublicKey: alice.getSigningPublicKeyData())
let stored = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !carol.courierStore.isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!stored)
}
@Test func courierDepositTrustUsesIngressPeerNotClaimedSender() async throws {
let alice = makeService()
let carol = makeService()
let mallory = makeService()
preseedConnectedPeer(alice, in: carol)
preseedConnectedPeer(mallory, in: carol)
let trustedAliceKey = Data(hexString: alice.myPeerID.id) ?? Data()
carol.courierDepositPolicy = { depositorKey, _ in
depositorKey == trustedAliceKey ? .favorite : nil
}
let aliceNoise = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain())
let bobKey = NoiseEncryptionService(keychain: MockKeychain()).getStaticPublicKeyData()
let typedPayload = try #require(BLENoisePayloadFactory.privateMessage(content: "spoofed", messageID: "m-spoof"))
let sealed = try aliceNoise.sealCourierPayload(typedPayload, recipientStaticKey: bobKey)
let now = Date()
let envelope = CourierEnvelope(
recipientTag: CourierEnvelope.recipientTag(
noiseStaticKey: bobKey,
epochDay: CourierEnvelope.epochDay(for: now)
),
expiry: UInt64((now.timeIntervalSince1970 + 3600) * 1000),
ciphertext: sealed
)
let packet = BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.courierEnvelope.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: alice.myPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: Data(hexString: carol.myPeerID.id),
timestamp: UInt64(now.timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: try #require(envelope.encode()),
signature: nil,
ttl: 1
)
carol._test_handlePacket(packet, fromPeerID: mallory.myPeerID, preseedPeer: false)
let stored = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !carol.courierStore.isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!stored)
}
/// Regression for the relaunch amplification storm: redundant copies of
/// one message arrive as *distinct* envelopes (every seal uses a fresh
/// ephemeral key), so only the inner message ID can dedup them. The first
/// copy delivers; duplicates must stop right after the decrypt no
/// second delivery, no second ack/handshake trigger downstream.
@Test func duplicateCourierCopiesDeliverInnerMessageOnce() async throws {
let alice = makeService()
let bob = makeService()
let bobDelegate = NoiseCaptureDelegate()
bob.delegate = bobDelegate
let bobKey = bob.noiseStaticPublicKeyData()
let first = try #require(alice.sealBridgeCourierEnvelope("once", messageID: "dup-1", recipientNoiseKey: bobKey))
let second = try #require(alice.sealBridgeCourierEnvelope("once", messageID: "dup-1", recipientNoiseKey: bobKey))
// Distinct seals: envelope-level dedup can never catch this pair.
#expect(first.ciphertext != second.ciphertext)
#expect(bob.openBridgedCourierEnvelope(first))
#expect(bob.openBridgedCourierEnvelope(second))
let delivered = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ !bobDelegate.snapshot().isEmpty },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(delivered)
// Give a duplicate delivery a chance to surface, then confirm the
// second copy never reached the delegate.
let duplicated = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ bobDelegate.snapshot().count > 1 },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!duplicated)
#expect(bobDelegate.snapshot().count == 1)
}
/// Acks for mail from absent senders (the usual couriered/bridged case)
/// queue for a future session instead of initiating a handshake
/// broadcast otherwise every duplicate copy of every drop turns into a
/// mesh-wide handshake flood at an identity that cannot answer.
@Test func deliveryAckForAbsentPeerQueuesWithoutHandshake() async throws {
let ble = makeService()
let outbound = PacketTap()
ble._test_onOutboundPacket = outbound.record
// Nobody by this ID on the mesh (not connected, not reachable).
ble.sendDeliveryAck(for: "msg-1", to: PeerID(str: "00000000000000ee"))
let initiated = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .noiseHandshake) > 0 },
timeout: TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow
)
#expect(!initiated)
// Control: a peer that is actually around still gets the handshake.
let present = PeerID(str: "00000000000000ef")
ble._test_seedConnectedPeer(present, nickname: "present")
ble.sendDeliveryAck(for: "msg-2", to: present)
let initiatedForPresent = await TestHelpers.waitUntil(
{ outbound.count(ofType: .noiseHandshake) > 0 },
timeout: TestConstants.settleTimeout
)
#expect(initiatedForPresent)
}
private func makeUnsignedAnnounce(from service: BLEService) throws -> BitchatPacket {
let announcement = AnnouncementPacket(
nickname: "Unsigned",
noisePublicKey: service.noiseStaticPublicKeyData(),
signingPublicKey: service.noiseSigningPublicKeyData(),
directNeighbors: nil
)
let payload = try #require(announcement.encode())
return BitchatPacket(
type: MessageType.announce.rawValue,
senderID: Data(hexString: service.myPeerID.id) ?? Data(),
recipientID: nil,
timestamp: UInt64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000),
payload: payload,
signature: nil,
ttl: TransportConfig.messageTTLDefault
)
}
}
// MARK: - Router courier selection
/// Minimal transport stub for exercising MessageRouter's courier deposit
/// logic without BLE plumbing.
private final class CourierCaptureTransport: Transport, MeshCourierTransporting {
weak var delegate: BitchatDelegate?
weak var eventDelegate: TransportEventDelegate?
weak var peerEventsDelegate: TransportPeerEventsDelegate?
var snapshots: [TransportPeerSnapshot] = []
private(set) var courierSends: [(messageID: String, recipientKey: Data, couriers: [PeerID])] = []
private(set) var directSends: [String] = []
func currentPeerSnapshots() -> [TransportPeerSnapshot] { snapshots }
var myPeerID = PeerID(str: "00000000000000aa")
var myNickname = "stub"
func setNickname(_ nickname: String) {}
func startServices() {}
func stopServices() {}
func emergencyDisconnectAll() {}
func isPeerConnected(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
snapshots.contains { $0.peerID == peerID && $0.isConnected }
}
// Nostr-style reachability: claimed for peers with no live link (known
// npub), where prompt delivery additionally needs a relay connection.
var reachablePeers: Set<PeerID> = []
var promptDelivery = true
func isPeerReachable(_ peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
isPeerConnected(peerID) || reachablePeers.contains(peerID)
}
func canDeliverPromptly(to peerID: PeerID) -> Bool {
isPeerReachable(peerID) && promptDelivery
}
func peerNickname(peerID: PeerID) -> String? { nil }
func getPeerNicknames() -> [PeerID: String] { [:] }
func getFingerprint(for peerID: PeerID) -> String? { nil }
func getNoiseSessionState(for peerID: PeerID) -> LazyHandshakeState { .none }
func triggerHandshake(with peerID: PeerID) {}
func sendMessage(_ content: String, mentions: [String]) {}
func sendPrivateMessage(_ content: String, to peerID: PeerID, recipientNickname: String, messageID: String) {
directSends.append(messageID)
}
func sendReadReceipt(_ receipt: ReadReceipt, to peerID: PeerID) {}
func sendFavoriteNotification(to peerID: PeerID, isFavorite: Bool) {}
func sendBroadcastAnnounce() {}
func sendDeliveryAck(for messageID: String, to peerID: PeerID) {}
func sendCourierMessage(_ content: String, messageID: String, recipientNoiseKey: Data, via couriers: [PeerID]) -> Bool {
courierSends.append((messageID, recipientNoiseKey, couriers))
return true
}
}
struct MessageRouterCourierTests {
@Test @MainActor
func unreachablePeerMessageGoesToTrustedCouriersOnly() {
let bobKey = Data(repeating: 0xB0, count: 32)
let bobID = PeerID(publicKey: bobKey)
let carolKey = Data(repeating: 0xC0, count: 32)
let carolID = PeerID(publicKey: carolKey)
let daveKey = Data(repeating: 0xD0, count: 32)
let daveID = PeerID(publicKey: daveKey)
let transport = CourierCaptureTransport()
transport.snapshots = [
// Carol: connected mutual favorite eligible courier.
TransportPeerSnapshot(peerID: carolID, nickname: "carol", isConnected: true, noisePublicKey: carolKey, lastSeen: Date()),
// Dave: connected but not trusted never a courier.
TransportPeerSnapshot(peerID: daveID, nickname: "dave", isConnected: true, noisePublicKey: daveKey, lastSeen: Date())
]
let directory = CourierDirectory(
noiseKey: { peerID in peerID == bobID ? bobKey : nil },
isTrustedCourier: { $0 == carolKey }
)
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport], courierDirectory: directory)
var carried: [String] = []
router.onMessageCarried = { messageID, _ in carried.append(messageID) }
router.sendPrivate("hi bob", to: bobID, recipientNickname: "bob", messageID: "m1")
#expect(transport.directSends.isEmpty)
#expect(transport.courierSends.count == 1)
#expect(transport.courierSends.first?.messageID == "m1")
#expect(transport.courierSends.first?.recipientKey == bobKey)
#expect(transport.courierSends.first?.couriers == [carolID])
#expect(carried == ["m1"])
}
/// Field-found: a DM sent while the recipient sits in the BLE
/// reachability retention window (radio gone, still "reachable" for a
/// minute) trusts the mesh and skips every deposit and nothing
/// retried. The periodic sweep must publish the bridge drop once the
/// window lapses.
@Test @MainActor
func sweepDropsQueuedMessageOnceReachabilityLapses() {
let bobKey = Data(repeating: 0xB0, count: 32)
let bobID = PeerID(publicKey: bobKey)
let transport = CourierCaptureTransport()
transport.reachablePeers = [bobID] // retention window: stale but "reachable"
transport.promptDelivery = true
let directory = CourierDirectory(
noiseKey: { peerID in peerID == bobID ? bobKey : nil },
isTrustedCourier: { _ in false }
)
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport], courierDirectory: directory)
var drops: [(content: String, messageID: String, key: Data)] = []
router.bridgeCourierDeposit = { content, messageID, key, completion in
drops.append((content, messageID, key))
completion(true)
}
var carried: [String] = []
router.onMessageCarried = { messageID, _ in carried.append(messageID) }
router.sendPrivate("hi bob", to: bobID, recipientNickname: "bob", messageID: "m9")
#expect(drops.isEmpty) // send trusted the (stale) mesh reachability
// Still inside the window: the sweep must not spam relays.
router.retryBridgeCourierDeposits()
#expect(drops.isEmpty)
// Window lapses; the sweep publishes the retained copy as a drop and
// the sender's message shows "carried" (its ack has no radio route).
transport.reachablePeers = []
router.retryBridgeCourierDeposits()
#expect(drops.count == 1)
#expect(drops.first?.messageID == "m9")
#expect(drops.first?.content == "hi bob")
#expect(drops.first?.key == bobKey)
#expect(carried == ["m9"])
}
@Test @MainActor
func noCourierDepositWithoutKnownRecipientKey() {
let transport = CourierCaptureTransport()
transport.snapshots = [
TransportPeerSnapshot(peerID: PeerID(str: "00000000000000cc"), nickname: "carol", isConnected: true, noisePublicKey: Data(repeating: 0xC0, count: 32), lastSeen: Date())
]
let directory = CourierDirectory(noiseKey: { _ in nil }, isTrustedCourier: { _ in true })
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport], courierDirectory: directory)
var carried: [String] = []
router.onMessageCarried = { messageID, _ in carried.append(messageID) }
router.sendPrivate("hi", to: PeerID(str: "00000000000000bb"), recipientNickname: "bob", messageID: "m2")
#expect(transport.courierSends.isEmpty)
#expect(carried.isEmpty)
}
/// The production directory must resolve both ID forms: a 64-hex
/// noise-key ID (offline favorite row) carries the key itself, and a
/// short 16-hex ID resolves through the favorites store.
@Test @MainActor
func favoritesBackedDirectoryResolvesBothIDForms() {
let directory = CourierDirectory.favoritesBacked()
let bobKey = Data(repeating: 0xB7, count: 32)
#expect(directory.noiseKey(PeerID(hexData: bobKey)) == bobKey)
FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.addFavorite(peerNoisePublicKey: bobKey, peerNickname: "bob")
defer { FavoritesPersistenceService.shared.removeFavorite(peerNoisePublicKey: bobKey) }
#expect(directory.noiseKey(PeerID(publicKey: bobKey)) == bobKey)
}
@Test @MainActor
func reachablePeerSkipsCourier() {
let bobKey = Data(repeating: 0xB0, count: 32)
let bobID = PeerID(publicKey: bobKey)
let transport = CourierCaptureTransport()
transport.snapshots = [
TransportPeerSnapshot(peerID: bobID, nickname: "bob", isConnected: true, noisePublicKey: bobKey, lastSeen: Date())
]
let directory = CourierDirectory(noiseKey: { _ in bobKey }, isTrustedCourier: { _ in true })
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport], courierDirectory: directory)
router.sendPrivate("hi", to: bobID, recipientNickname: "bob", messageID: "m3")
#expect(transport.directSends == ["m3"])
#expect(transport.courierSends.isEmpty)
}
/// A peer can be "reachable" through a transport that cannot deliver
/// promptly (Nostr claims any favorite with a known npub, even with no
/// relay connection). The queued send must not shadow the courier: a
/// sealed copy goes to connected couriers in parallel, and receivers
/// dedup by message ID if both arrive.
@Test @MainActor
func queuedReachableSendAlsoDepositsWithCourier() {
let bobKey = Data(repeating: 0xB0, count: 32)
let bobID = PeerID(publicKey: bobKey)
let carolKey = Data(repeating: 0xC0, count: 32)
let carolID = PeerID(publicKey: carolKey)
let transport = CourierCaptureTransport()
transport.snapshots = [
TransportPeerSnapshot(peerID: carolID, nickname: "carol", isConnected: true, noisePublicKey: carolKey, lastSeen: Date())
]
transport.reachablePeers = [bobID]
transport.promptDelivery = false
let directory = CourierDirectory(
noiseKey: { peerID in peerID == bobID ? bobKey : nil },
isTrustedCourier: { $0 == carolKey }
)
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport], courierDirectory: directory)
var carried: [String] = []
router.onMessageCarried = { messageID, _ in carried.append(messageID) }
router.sendPrivate("hi bob", to: bobID, recipientNickname: "bob", messageID: "m4")
#expect(transport.directSends == ["m4"])
#expect(transport.courierSends.count == 1)
#expect(transport.courierSends.first?.messageID == "m4")
#expect(transport.courierSends.first?.couriers == [carolID])
#expect(carried == ["m4"])
}
/// When the reachable transport can deliver promptly (relays up), the
/// send is trusted and no courier quota is spent.
@Test @MainActor
func promptlyDeliverableReachablePeerSkipsCourier() {
let bobKey = Data(repeating: 0xB0, count: 32)
let bobID = PeerID(publicKey: bobKey)
let carolKey = Data(repeating: 0xC0, count: 32)
let carolID = PeerID(publicKey: carolKey)
let transport = CourierCaptureTransport()
transport.snapshots = [
TransportPeerSnapshot(peerID: carolID, nickname: "carol", isConnected: true, noisePublicKey: carolKey, lastSeen: Date())
]
transport.reachablePeers = [bobID]
let directory = CourierDirectory(
noiseKey: { peerID in peerID == bobID ? bobKey : nil },
isTrustedCourier: { $0 == carolKey }
)
let router = MessageRouter(transports: [transport], courierDirectory: directory)
var carried: [String] = []
router.onMessageCarried = { messageID, _ in carried.append(messageID) }
router.sendPrivate("hi bob", to: bobID, recipientNickname: "bob", messageID: "m5")
#expect(transport.directSends == ["m5"])
#expect(transport.courierSends.isEmpty)
#expect(carried.isEmpty)
}
}