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* Validate relay-directory changes in PR CI The weekly automation validates a relay snapshot before it pushes its branch, but that check lives inside the scheduled job. A change to the reviewed relay directory that arrives as a pull request is validated by nothing at all, which is the ground two relay-data PRs were closed on: "PR CI doesn't run the validator, and untraceable relay-directory updates aren't something we can merge on faith" (#1632, also #1673). This runs the validator on a pull request touching relays/ or the validator itself, against the base branch's reviewed copy, and publishes the row count, unique-relay count and SHA-256 to the job summary. The hash is the point: the relay automation already publishes one for every snapshot it proposes, so a reviewer can now match a proposed file against it instead of taking provenance on faith. The gate deliberately runs the base branch's validator rather than the pull request's copy of it. Otherwise a change that edits the data and the validator together certifies itself -- dropping 86% of the directory passes if the same commit relaxes MIN_BASELINE_FRACTION, and the summary still reports "validated". The scheduled job validates from a main checkout for the same reason. The pull request's own validator is still exercised by the unit-test step. A pull_request run executes the workflow definition from the pull request's own head, so a pull request can always edit this file and change its own gate. That path is visible in the diff, which is what review is for; what the reviewed-validator gate closes is the quiet one. Read-only and never pull_request_target: the job runs PR-authored code, so it holds no write scope and no secrets. checkout is @v5 like the other read-only PR workflows rather than SHA-pinned, since that pin exists to protect the write-capable token in fetch_georelays.yml. What it catches: malformed rows, out-of-range coordinates, insecure hosts, conflicting duplicate relays, and snapshots that lose half or double the baseline's relays. What it does not: a re-ordered file whose rows are each valid still passes -- with a different hash, which the summary makes visible. The accompanying test asserts the job's security-relevant shape as text, following the precedent in test_fetch_georelays_workflow.py: the trigger, the absent write scope, --output never pointed at the tracked CSV, and that the gate reads the validator from the base branch. * Split the gate from the code under review Codex review on d627b9f found three holes, all confirmed by rehearsal. The gate ran the base branch's validator, but read the candidate from the worktree and ran the pull request's unit tests first. A test file that rewrites relays/online_relays_gps.csv at import time therefore decided what the gate validated: the summary reported 441 rows and the hash of a file the pull request never proposed, exit 0, while the 60-row CSV in the commit was what would merge. The published hash is the whole argument for reviewing relay data on evidence, so a hash that can describe different bytes than the ones merging is worse than no hash at all. The workflow is now two jobs with an explicit split: - gate is the trust boundary. It checks out the base commit, so nothing the pull request wrote is present to run, and reads the candidate as a git object pinned to the event's head SHA instead of from a worktree. Both inputs come from the event, so a base branch that advances while the job is queued cannot change the verdict. - proposed-validator runs pull-request code, so it is not a trust boundary. It runs the unit tests and, new here, the proposed validator against the real directory. Without that a validator change is only ever exercised against small synthetic fixtures: capping MAX_ROWS at 400 passes the unit tests and the gate, then breaks the weekly automation after merge with "CSV exceeds 400 data rows". Checking out the base commit also removes last round's git show of the validator -- at base.sha the reviewed validator is simply the one in the workspace. Rehearsed per case, with each branch's diff verified first: a malicious PR that swaps the CSV from a test now exits 1 where it previously passed green; the current automation snapshot still validates to the hash published in #1617; a corrupt CSV, a stricter validator, and a CI-only change all land where they should.