* Run the frigate service as the frigate user
* Run go2rtc as its own restricted user
* Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx
* Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root
* Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user
* Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access
* Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep
* Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI
* only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted
* tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script
* chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout
* set HOME to /config for non-root services
* run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user
* re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart
* discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t
* unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs
* report progress during the ownership sweep
* document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services
* expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules
* document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware
* skip lost+found during the ownership sweep
* hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start
* make bundled models readable by the runtime user
* reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root
* harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths
Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a
parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild
/tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot
follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run.
* collapse the duplicated sentinel comment
* add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services
* validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names
* let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop
* record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot
* cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper
* chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create
* chown the database files after init
* recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning
* assert granular root services in CI
* document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES
* own every directory level created for a recording segment
* clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish
* skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep
* clarify granular root services docs
* clean up
* install acl for device access grants
* grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot
* assert device access grants in CI
* document automatic device access grants
* stop telling users device access needs host side setup
* clarify the non-root docs
* link the migration script to the repo
* group the manual device setup under one section
* harden against symlink attacks
/config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink.
- go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file
- go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES
- sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file
- ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume
- validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids
- docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens
* tweak docs
* stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own
* keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
* Non-Jetson changes
Required for later commits:
- Allow base image to be overridden (and don't assume its WORKDIR)
- Ensure python3.9
- Map hwaccel decode presets as strings instead of lists
Not required:
- Fix existing documentation
- Simplify hwaccel scale logic
* Prepare for multi-arch tensorrt build
* Add tensorrt images for Jetson boards
* Add Jetson ffmpeg hwaccel
* Update docs
* Add CODEOWNERS
* CI
* Change default model from yolov7-tiny-416 to yolov7-320
In my experience the tiny models perform markedly worse without being
much faster
* fixup! Update docs
* Make main frigate build non rpi specific and build rpi using base image
* Add boards to sidebar
* Fix docker build
* Fix docs build
* Update pr branch for testing
* remove target from rpi build
* Remove manual build
* Add push build for rpi
* fix typos, improve wording
* Add arm build for rpi
* Cleanup and add default github ref name
* Cleanup docker build file system
* Setup to use docker bake
* Add ci/cd for bake
* Fix path
* Fix devcontainer
* Set targets
* Fix build
* Fix syntax
* Add wheels target
* Move dev container to trt
* Update key and fix rpi local
* Move requirements files and set intermediate targets
* Add back --load
* Update docs for community board development
* Update installation docs to reflect different builds available
* Update docs with official and community supported headers
* Update codeowners docs
* Update docs
* Assemble main and standard builds
* Change order of pushes
* Remove community board after successful build
* Fix rpi bake file names
