frigate/frigate/test/test_ffmpeg_path_resolution.py
Josh Hawkins 3be59c9c18 Container security hardening (phase 3, breaking) (#24081)
* Run the frigate service as the frigate user

* Run go2rtc as its own restricted user

* Run nginx as the frigate user with writable state in /tmp/nginx

* Disable bandwidth stats gracefully when not running as root

* Hand TensorRT model cache ownership to the runtime user

* Document non-root operation and per-hardware device access

* Create /media/frigate after the ownership sweep

* Assert non-root services, JWT migration, and escape hatch in CI

* only write the sweep sentinel when a media volume is mounted

* tolerate homekit config chown failures in the go2rtc run script

* chown the s6 log pipe so non-root nginx can reopen /dev/stdout

* set HOME to /config for non-root services

* run smoke nginx -t and the write probe as the runtime user

* re-own the nginx shm cache on service restart

* discard stdout for the unprivileged smoke nginx -t

* unwrap hard-wrapped prose in the installation docs

* report progress during the ownership sweep

* document EXTRA_GROUPS as the only device access path for dropped services

* expand the non-root device access docs with diagnosis steps and udev rules

* document network storage ownership and the remaining detector hardware

* skip lost+found during the ownership sweep

* hand /tmp/cache to the runtime user before services start

* make bundled models readable by the runtime user

* reload nginx by signaling the master instead of parsing its config as root

* harden root writes into unprivileged-owned paths

Restrict the sweep sentinel to a mount at or below /media/frigate so a
parent /media mount cannot bless a later-shadowed volume. Rebuild
/tmp/nginx root-owned each start so root's cp and tempio writes cannot
follow a symlink an unprivileged nginx planted in the previous run.

* collapse the duplicated sentinel comment

* add a service-runs-as-root helper for granular root services

* validate FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES and fail fast on unknown names

* let services listed in FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES skip the privilege drop

* record the root-services mode in the sentinel and sweep small trees each boot

* cache the runtime ids in the ownership helper

* chown recordings, previews, and exports to the runtime user at create

* chown the database files after init

* recommend FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES in the bandwidth stats warning

* assert granular root services in CI

* document FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES

* own every directory level created for a recording segment

* clear the cached runtime ids when ownership tests finish

* skip missing media paths in the per-boot ownership sweep

* clarify granular root services docs

* clean up

* install acl for device access grants

* grant runtime users access to mapped device nodes at boot

* assert device access grants in CI

* document automatic device access grants

* stop telling users device access needs host side setup

* clarify the non-root docs

* link the migration script to the repo

* group the manual device setup under one section

* harden against symlink attacks

/config is owned by the unprivileged runtime user after the ownership sweep, so root operations on files there could be redirected by a planted symlink.

- go2rtc HomeKit setup: replace the root yq/jq normalization and chown with an O_NOFOLLOW helper (prepare_homekit.py), so a symlink at go2rtc_homekit.yml can't redirect a root write or chown onto another file
- go2rtc binary override: ignore /config/go2rtc whenever the service runs as root, so a planted binary can't exec as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES
- sweep sentinel: read and write it through safe-sentinel, which trusts only a root-owned regular file and never follows a symlink, so it can't be forged to skip the migration or symlinked to clobber a root file
- ownership sweep: chown with -execdir so a parent directory swapped for a symlink mid-walk can't redirect the chown out of the volume
- validate inputs: restrict DEVICE_ACL_PATHS to /dev, require nonzero numeric EXTRA_GROUPS, and reject PUID/PGID that collide with the go2rtc ids
- docs: correct the TLS key ownership note to match what actually happens

* tweak docs

* stop the ownership sweep chasing entries other mechanisms own

* keep custom binaries out of root services only under granular root
2026-09-12 07:30:04 -06:00

155 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""Tests for custom ffmpeg path resolution and the root-mode guard."""
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
from frigate.const import DEFAULT_FFMPEG_VERSION
from frigate.util.config import (
_warn_ignored_ffmpeg_path,
frigate_service_is_granular_root,
resolve_ffmpeg_path,
)
BUNDLED = f"/usr/lib/ffmpeg/{DEFAULT_FFMPEG_VERSION}/bin/ffmpeg"
CUSTOM = "/config/custom-ffmpeg"
class TestConfigFfmpegRootGuard(unittest.TestCase):
"""A user-writable ffmpeg must not run as root under FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES."""
def setUp(self) -> None:
# the warning is memoized so it fires once per path, not per camera
_warn_ignored_ffmpeg_path.cache_clear()
def _resolve(self, path: str, *, euid: int, env: dict, binary: str = "ffmpeg"):
with (
patch("os.geteuid", return_value=euid),
patch.dict("os.environ", env, clear=True),
):
return resolve_ffmpeg_path(path, binary)
def test_custom_path_used_when_service_is_unprivileged(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(CUSTOM, euid=1000, env={}), f"{CUSTOM}/bin/ffmpeg"
)
def test_escape_hatch_keeps_working_exactly_as_before(self) -> None:
# FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT never sweeps /config and leaves no unprivileged
# service, so a custom build there is as safe as it was pre-drop
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(CUSTOM, euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT": "true"}),
f"{CUSTOM}/bin/ffmpeg",
)
def test_custom_path_ignored_when_frigate_is_a_root_service(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(CUSTOM, euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"}),
BUNDLED,
)
def test_ffprobe_is_guarded_too(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(
CUSTOM,
euid=0,
env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"},
binary="ffprobe",
),
f"/usr/lib/ffmpeg/{DEFAULT_FFMPEG_VERSION}/bin/ffprobe",
)
def test_another_root_service_does_not_trigger_the_guard(self) -> None:
# go2rtc running as root says nothing about who spawns ffmpeg
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(CUSTOM, euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "go2rtc"}),
f"{CUSTOM}/bin/ffmpeg",
)
def test_root_services_has_no_effect_under_docker_user(self) -> None:
# docker's own user: means the service never had root to keep, which is
# also the case for get_ffmpeg_path.py in a --user container
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(CUSTOM, euid=1000, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"}),
f"{CUSTOM}/bin/ffmpeg",
)
def test_path_outside_config_is_left_alone(self) -> None:
# only /config is runtime-user-owned; a root-owned tree stays usable
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(
"/opt/custom-ffmpeg", euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"}
),
"/opt/custom-ffmpeg/bin/ffmpeg",
)
def test_traversal_out_of_config_does_not_evade_the_guard(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(
"/config/../config/custom-ffmpeg",
euid=0,
env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"},
),
BUNDLED,
)
def test_media_tree_is_guarded_too(self) -> None:
# config.yml is uid-1000-writable, so ffmpeg.path can be pointed at any
# writable tree; /config alone would be an evasion, not a guard
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve(
"/media/frigate/evil", euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"}
),
BUNDLED,
)
def test_config_dir_itself_is_guarded(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve("/config", euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"}),
BUNDLED,
)
def test_default_alias_is_unaffected(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual(
self._resolve("default", euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"}),
BUNDLED,
)
class TestFrigateServiceIsGranularRoot(unittest.TestCase):
"""Root via FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES only, never via the escape hatch."""
def _check(self, *, euid: int, env: dict) -> bool:
with (
patch("os.geteuid", return_value=euid),
patch.dict("os.environ", env, clear=True),
):
return frigate_service_is_granular_root()
def test_false_without_any_root_signal(self) -> None:
self.assertFalse(self._check(euid=0, env={}))
def test_escape_hatch_is_not_granular_root(self) -> None:
# the escape hatch restores old behavior wholesale, sweep included
self.assertFalse(self._check(euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT": "true"}))
self.assertFalse(
self._check(
euid=0,
env={"FRIGATE_RUN_AS_ROOT": "true", "FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigate"},
)
)
def test_membership_ignores_whitespace_and_other_entries(self) -> None:
self.assertTrue(
self._check(euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "go2rtc, frigate"})
)
self.assertFalse(
self._check(euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "go2rtc,nginx"})
)
def test_substring_of_a_service_name_does_not_match(self) -> None:
self.assertFalse(self._check(euid=0, env={"FRIGATE_ROOT_SERVICES": "frigatee"}))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()