navidrome/core/auth/auth.go
Deluan Quintão 59810c3d59
feat(jellyfin): non-expiring, audience-scoped tokens revocable by password change (#6013)
* feat(auth): add per-user token_epoch column and bump method

* feat(auth): add aud and ep claims, omitted when zero

* feat(auth): add CreateAPIToken for non-expiring, audience-scoped tokens

* feat(auth): add CheckClaims for epoch and audience validation

* feat(jellyfin): issue non-expiring, jellyfin-scoped access tokens

* fix(subsonic): reject API-scoped and revoked tokens on the jwt path

* fix(server): reject API-scoped and revoked tokens on the native API

* fix(server): pin the token-subject guard and stop leaking test config

Adds a regression spec for the DevAutoLogin/ExtAuth guard in
tokenAllowed, switches its comparison to case-insensitive to match
the user lookup's own COLLATE NOCASE semantics, and restores Subsonic
JWT test config after each spec instead of leaking SessionTimeout.

* feat(request): add a token epoch holder for handler-to-middleware signalling

* refactor(server): write the refreshed JWT header after the handler runs

* feat(auth): revoke all tokens for a user when their password changes

* fix(server): restore Unwrap on the JWT refresh writer so SSE write deadlines apply

* test(auth): pin that non-session tokens reject API access tokens

* test(jellyfin): pin token scoping and epoch revocation end to end

Exercises auth.CreateAPIToken and CheckClaims against the real Jellyfin
router and SQLite DB: the minted token has no exp and is aud-scoped to
jellyfin, and bumping token_epoch through the real UserRepository revokes
an already-issued token on the next protected request.

* test(nativeapi): pin the token-epoch handoff through a real password-change request

Drive a self password change through the real Authenticator/JWTRefresher
chain and a real SQLite-backed userRepository, so the epoch handoff between
Put and the refreshed-token writer is verified end to end, not as two
separately-tested halves. Also fix tokenAllowed to read the enriched ctx it
was given instead of r.Context(), so its warning log carries the username.

* refactor(server): drop tokenAllowed's now-unused request parameter

Finding-2 already moved every use to ctx; r was dead weight. Also note
in the new nativeapi test why it must stay the package's only real-DB
spec: db.Db() is a process-wide singleton its cleanup closes for good.

* refactor(auth): remove duplication in claim decoding and token minting

* refactor(auth): group aud with the standard JWT claims

* refactor(auth): read aud with the standard-claim accessor pattern

* fix(log): redact every api_key spelling the Jellyfin API accepts

* fix(auth): bind session tokens to the user id, not just the username

* fix(auth): return the token epoch from the same atomic increment

* fix(auth): bump the token epoch in the same statement as the password write

* chore(auth): trim comments to the why-only budget
2026-08-22 20:36:24 -04:00

206 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"cmp"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"errors"
"slices"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/jwtauth/v5"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v3/jwt"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/conf"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/consts"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/log"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model/id"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/model/request"
"github.com/navidrome/navidrome/utils"
)
var (
once sync.Once
// TokenAuth signs UI/API session tokens. Rotated by the id migration so stale sessions die.
TokenAuth *jwtauth.JWTAuth
// PublicTokenAuth signs public-link tokens (artwork, share streams), on a separate secret that survives the rotation.
PublicTokenAuth *jwtauth.JWTAuth
)
// Audiences a session token can be scoped to. A token with no audience is accepted anywhere.
const (
AudienceJellyfin = "jellyfin"
AudienceSubsonic = "subsonic"
AudienceNative = "native"
)
// Init creates the JWTAuth objects from the secrets stored in the DB.
// Missing or undecryptable secrets are regenerated and stored.
func Init(ds model.DataStore) {
once.Do(func() {
ctx := context.TODO()
log.Info("Setting Session Timeout", "value", conf.Server.SessionTimeout)
TokenAuth = jwtauth.New("HS256", []byte(loadOrCreateSecret(ctx, ds, consts.JWTSecretKey)), nil)
PublicTokenAuth = jwtauth.New("HS256", []byte(loadOrCreateSecret(ctx, ds, consts.JWTPublicSecretKey)), nil)
})
}
func loadOrCreateSecret(ctx context.Context, ds model.DataStore, key string) string {
secret, err := ds.Property(ctx).Get(key)
if err != nil || secret == "" {
log.Info(ctx, "Creating new JWT secret", "key", key)
return createNewSecret(ctx, ds, key)
}
if secret, err = utils.Decrypt(ctx, getEncKey(), secret); err != nil {
log.Error(ctx, "Could not decrypt JWT secret, creating a new one", "key", key, err)
return createNewSecret(ctx, ds, key)
}
return secret
}
func CreatePublicToken(claims Claims) (string, error) {
claims.Issuer = consts.JWTIssuer
_, token, err := PublicTokenAuth.Encode(claims.ToMap())
return token, err
}
func CreateExpiringPublicToken(exp time.Time, claims Claims) (string, error) {
claims.Issuer = consts.JWTIssuer
if !exp.IsZero() {
claims.ExpiresAt = exp
}
_, token, err := PublicTokenAuth.Encode(claims.ToMap())
return token, err
}
func userClaims(u *model.User, audience []string) Claims {
return Claims{
Issuer: consts.JWTIssuer,
Subject: u.UserName,
IssuedAt: time.Now(),
UserID: u.ID,
IsAdmin: u.IsAdmin,
Epoch: u.TokenEpoch,
Audience: audience,
}
}
func CreateToken(u *model.User) (string, error) {
token, _, err := TokenAuth.Encode(userClaims(u, nil).ToMap())
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return TouchToken(token)
}
// CreateAPIToken mints a non-expiring token scoped to one API, matching how Jellyfin
// clients expect tokens to behave. Revocation is by token epoch, not expiry.
func CreateAPIToken(u *model.User, audience string) (string, error) {
_, token, err := TokenAuth.Encode(userClaims(u, []string{audience}).ToMap())
return token, err
}
func TouchToken(token jwt.Token) (string, error) {
return TouchClaims(ClaimsFromToken(token))
}
func TouchClaims(c Claims) (string, error) {
c = c.WithExpiresAt(time.Now().UTC().Add(conf.Server.SessionTimeout))
_, newToken, err := TokenAuth.Encode(c.ToMap())
return newToken, err
}
func Validate(tokenStr string) (Claims, error) {
token, err := jwtauth.VerifyToken(TokenAuth, tokenStr)
if err != nil {
return Claims{}, err
}
return ClaimsFromToken(token), nil
}
// ValidatePublic verifies a public-link token against the public secret.
func ValidatePublic(tokenStr string) (Claims, error) {
token, err := jwtauth.VerifyToken(PublicTokenAuth, tokenStr)
if err != nil {
return Claims{}, err
}
return ClaimsFromToken(token), nil
}
var (
ErrTokenRevoked = errors.New("token revoked")
ErrWrongAudience = errors.New("token not valid for this API")
ErrWrongUser = errors.New("token issued for a different user")
)
// CheckClaims gates a session token against the user it names. Callers must have already
// verified the signature; this adds revocation and API scoping on top.
func CheckClaims(c Claims, usr model.User, audience string) error {
// Usernames can be reused: deleting a user and recreating the name yields a new random id
// at epoch 0, which an old token would otherwise match.
if c.UserID != "" && c.UserID != usr.ID {
return ErrWrongUser
}
if c.Epoch != usr.TokenEpoch {
return ErrTokenRevoked
}
if len(c.Audience) > 0 && !slices.Contains(c.Audience, audience) {
return ErrWrongAudience
}
return nil
}
func WithAdminUser(ctx context.Context, ds model.DataStore) context.Context {
u, err := ds.User(ctx).FindFirstAdmin()
if err != nil {
c, err := ds.User(ctx).CountAll()
if c == 0 && err == nil {
log.Debug(ctx, "No admin user yet!", err)
} else {
log.Error(ctx, "No admin user found!", err)
}
u = &model.User{IsAdmin: true, UserName: "admin"}
}
ctx = request.WithUsername(ctx, u.UserName)
return request.WithUser(ctx, *u)
}
func createNewSecret(ctx context.Context, ds model.DataStore, key string) string {
secret := id.NewRandom()
encSecret, err := utils.Encrypt(ctx, getEncKey(), secret)
if err != nil {
log.Error(ctx, "Could not encrypt JWT secret", err)
return secret
}
if err := ds.Property(ctx).Put(key, encSecret); err != nil {
log.Error(ctx, "Could not save JWT secret in DB", err)
}
return secret
}
// EncodeToken creates a signed JWT from an arbitrary claims map.
// It sets the issuer claim automatically.
func EncodeToken(claims map[string]any) (string, error) {
claims[jwt.IssuerKey] = consts.JWTIssuer
_, token, err := TokenAuth.Encode(claims)
return token, err
}
// DecodeAndVerifyToken verifies a JWT string and returns the parsed token.
func DecodeAndVerifyToken(tokenStr string) (jwt.Token, error) {
return jwtauth.VerifyToken(TokenAuth, tokenStr)
}
func getEncKey() []byte {
key := cmp.Or(
conf.Server.PasswordEncryptionKey,
consts.DefaultEncryptionKey,
)
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
return sum[:]
}