Split the existing PR change into a smaller reviewable piece. Original change: Reject overflowed verification QR timestamp differences
4.4 KiB
Noise peer-ID binding
Mesh wire peer IDs are exactly 16 lowercase hexadecimal characters derived as
hex(SHA-256(noiseStaticPublicKey)[0..<8]). Android enforces that binding at
both identity entry points:
- A verified announcement must carry a 32-byte Noise static key whose derived ID matches both the packet sender and routed sender.
- A Noise XX initiator or responder must authenticate a remote static key whose derived ID matches the claimed session key before transport ciphers are exposed or an authentication callback runs.
Inbound rehandshakes use a separate responder candidate. An established session remains active until the candidate completes and passes the binding; failure or mismatch destroys only the candidate. BLE mappings, Wi-Fi socket rebinds, gossip, sync, and peer-last-seen effects run only after announcement validation succeeds. A Wi-Fi discovery identity is not destructively rebound from a self-signed announce. A direct announce creates only a provisional claim and starts a fresh replacement handshake on that exact transport generation. The alias is promoted only when the same challenged, still-active socket delivers the Noise frame that completes bound authentication. A peer-ID-only, unsolicited, cross-link, or stale-socket callback cannot authorize that rebind; the expected-socket comparison and alias mutation are atomic with socket replacement. Promotion also refuses to displace a different live socket already authenticated under the canonical peer ID.
Leave packets use the existing signed wire format and are accepted only when the signature matches the key learned from a verified announcement and the timestamp is within the five-minute security window. Invalid, stale, future, or unsigned leaves therefore cannot evict the claimed peer or be relayed. A valid leave removes the peer through the normal peer-manager path, which also clears its active Noise session.
Announcements no longer write fingerprint mappings. Those mappings are created only by the authenticated Noise-session callback. A known peer's signing key also cannot change based on an announcement or merely because some session for that peer ID is active. Rotation requires an authenticated peer-state proof tied to the exact Noise channel; ambient session presence is not enough. The same authenticated callback restores any existing Noise-key-to-Nostr relationship under the canonical 16-hex mesh ID; unproven announcements never write that routing index.
Generation-sensitive consumers use the 32-byte Noise handshake hash as a local session token. The hash is cloned before handshake-state zeroization, and session lookup, decrypt, expected-token encrypt, and leased identity mutation share the Noise manager lock. A same-static replacement therefore cannot reuse the previous generation's proof or destroy a session while a bound mutation is in progress.
Remaining TOFU boundary
The first public announcement is still self-signed trust-on-first-use. An attacker can copy a public Noise key and self-sign an announcement, but cannot complete the bound Noise handshake for that ID. Public-mesh identity admission is intentionally not gated behind an automatic handshake in this change; doing so is a separate availability/protocol decision.
Consequently, discovery metadata or capability bits in an announcement are hints, not proof of Noise-key possession. Security-sensitive capabilities must be confirmed inside the authenticated Noise channel before they are pinned or used to authorize a downgrade-sensitive behavior.
Verification QR freshness
Verification QR timestamps are signed Unix seconds. The scanner accepts a
validly signed QR only when its timestamp is within 300 seconds of the local
clock in either direction (inclusive), unless the caller supplies a different
age limit. Future dating does not extend this window. An absolute timestamp
difference larger than Long.MAX_VALUE saturates to Long.MAX_VALUE; signed
subtraction or absolute-value overflow must never produce a small accepted age.
Fixed freshness vectors at synthetic receiver time 1700000000 seconds:
| QR timestamp | Absolute skew | Default freshness result |
|---|---|---|
1699999700 |
300 | accept |
1700000300 |
300 | accept |
1699999699 |
301 | reject |
1700000301 |
301 | reject |
-9223372036854775808 |
saturated | reject |
9223372036854775807 |
greater than 300 | reject |
Signature and key validation still apply after this freshness check.