* Deflake two iOS-sim CI tests with unbounded timing assumptions
Both failed on main-adjacent CI runs during this session's PRs. Neither
was a product bug; both asserted things about real time that a loaded
runner is under no obligation to honour.
**NetworkReachabilityGateTests: a wall-clock upper bound.**
test_monitor_duplicateUpdatesDoNotPostponeOfflineCommit slept 500ms for
real, then asserted total elapsed time was under 1.4s to prove a duplicate
mid-window had not restarted the 1.0s debounce. One CI run took 3.75s. No
wall-clock bound can separate "deadline preserved" from "runner is slow",
because Task.sleep and the asyncAfter flush are both real time and neither
is bounded above.
The deadline property was already covered deterministically one level
down: test_debounce_duplicateObservationsPreservePendingDeadline drives
ReachabilityDebounce with injected timestamps and checks pendingRemaining
directly. So the monitor test now asserts only what needs a real monitor —
that a duplicate still yields exactly one committed false through the
debounce — with an injected clock for the arithmetic and a generous
liveness budget. Renamed to say what it actually checks. No coverage lost,
and it runs in 0.14s instead of ~3.8s because the real sleep is gone.
**NoiseEncryptionServiceTests: injected timeouts that also arm during
setup.** #1483 diagnosed and fixed exactly this in the quarantine-restore
test, but two sibling tests kept the shape. Their injected
ordinaryResponderHandshakeTimeout (0.04 and 0.06) also arms during the
establishSessions setup handshake, where bob is the responder — so a
preempted runner fires it mid-setup, tears down the half-open responder,
and message 3 gets answered as a fresh initiation. The CI failure named
setup's own `#expect(finalMessage == nil)` seeing a 96-byte message 2,
which is precisely the signature #1483 recorded.
Raised both to 1.0s, matching #1483's remedy: the scenarios still need the
responder timeout to fire, and it still does, just with room for setup to
complete first. Thin 1-second waitUntil budgets in the file now use the
shared TestConstants.longTimeout; every one of them backs a positive
assertion, so waitUntil still returns the moment the condition holds and
nothing gets slower in the passing case.
No assertion weakened in either file. Verified 3x sequentially and 3x with
all 18 cores saturated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Raise two more starvation-prone test deadlines
Both surfaced on the CI runs for this PR and #1487, both in tests neither
PR touches, both the same shape as the two already fixed here: a deadline
sized for the work rather than for a runner executing many suites at once.
VoiceNotePlaybackControllerTests waited 5s for a @MainActor Task that
playback schedules for the session acquire and its failure path. When that
Task is not scheduled in time the helper reports *two* failures — the wait,
and the `!isPlaying` the un-run failure path has not reset yet — which
reads like a playback bug rather than a starved scheduler. That is exactly
what CI showed.
GeoRelayDirectoryTests waited 10s for work the directory runs in
Task.detached(priority: .utility); utility priority competes with every
other suite. The retry-scheduling case timed out at exactly 10.06s with the
retry never scheduled, reading like a missing retry rather than a starved
background task.
Raised to 30s each with the reasoning recorded at the helper. Both helpers
return as soon as their condition holds, so nothing slows down when tests
pass — only the genuine-failure case takes longer to report.
Verified 3x with all cores saturated: both suites clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Make the flake class unrepeatable, not just fixed
Raising four deadlines fixed the four tests that happened to fire. The
class was still there: fourteen separate waitUntil helpers, most defaulting
to 1.0s, plus wait call sites with literal budgets. The fifth instance
would have landed the same way, on someone else's unrelated PR.
The rule, now written down in TestConstants.settleTimeout: **a wait
deadline is not a latency budget.** It exists so a genuine hang eventually
fails the suite, so size it for the worst-case scheduler, never for how
long the operation should take. Waits return as soon as their condition
holds, so a generous deadline is free in the passing case and only extends
genuine failures.
- Every wait helper now defaults to TestConstants.settleTimeout (30s), and
the literal wait call sites below the floor were converted too — sixteen
sites across ten files.
- TestTimingHygieneTests enforces it by scanning the test sources: wait
defaults and wait call sites must be at least minimumSettleTimeout, and
no test may assert an upper bound on elapsed wall-clock time (the
assertion that started this, which cannot separate correct behaviour from
a slow machine).
- Both rules waive per line with "test-timing-ok: <reason>", accepted on
the line or in the comment block above it so the reason has room to be a
sentence. One legitimate use so far: a NEGATIVE wait in NoiseCoverageTests
asserting a promotion has *not* completed within 50ms, where a long
deadline would only make the suite slow while still passing.
Injected production timeouts are deliberately not matched — the Noise
handshake timeouts are the behaviour under test, and short values are
correct there.
Verified the guard actually fails: a canary file with both banned shapes
was flagged with file and line, and the suite went green again once it was
removed. Full suite passes with all 18 cores saturated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Close the guard's blind spot: named short timeouts
A fifth flake landed on CI while the first guard was in review —
GossipSyncBoardTests timing out at 1.03s — and the guard did not catch it,
because the deadline was `TestConstants.shortTimeout` rather than a
literal. A literals-only scan cannot see a short value behind a symbol,
which is the more common way it is written: 81 wait sites used
shortTimeout (1s) or defaultTimeout (5s), every one of them below the
floor.
Rather than guess which of those were safe to raise, all 81 were converted
and the suite timed. Runtime went 15s -> 72s, which located the genuine
negative waits precisely: ten tests that assert something does *not*
happen and therefore always run their deadline out. Measurement instead of
a heuristic, since a mis-guess in either direction is invisible — too
short reintroduces the flake, too long silently costs a minute a run.
Those 28 sites now use `TestConstants.negativeWaitWindow`, a named
constant whose doc explains the inverted reasoning: for a negative wait,
starvation can only make the assertion *more* likely to hold, so short is
correct, and the name states the polarity instead of leaving a bare
literal that reads like the mistake. Suite is back to 15.3s.
The guard now also rejects `timeout: TestConstants.shortTimeout` and
`defaultTimeout`, while accepting `negativeWaitWindow` by name.
Re-verified with a canary carrying every banned shape — literal default,
both named constants, and an elapsed-time upper bound. All four were
flagged with file and line; the suite went green again on removal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Delete shortTimeout now that nothing may use it
The hygiene guard bans `TestConstants.shortTimeout` at every wait site
and the last users were converted, so Periphery correctly flagged the
constant itself as dead and failed CI. Remove it from both TestConstants
copies; the banned-name entry stays so the symbol cannot quietly return.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add a real security policy
Two drive-by template PRs (#1118, #1482) tried to fill this gap with
unedited boilerplate. This is the actual policy: private vulnerability
reporting (now enabled on the repo) as the channel, honest expectations
for a volunteer project, and a scope section that separates the
properties the app promises from the documented design behaviors that
keep getting reported as vulnerabilities.
Closes#1081
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address Codex review: name the Nostr envelope format precisely
'Gift-wrapped' reads as NIP-59, and the scope section is exactly where
a researcher calibrates expectations. Say what it is: bitchat's own
private-envelope scheme, explicitly not NIP-17/44/59.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Keep the composer focused after sending with the return key
On iOS, return sends and then drops the keyboard, so every message in a
back-and-forth costs an extra tap to reopen it. sendMessage() is the
onSubmit handler; reasserting the FocusState there keeps the keyboard up
between messages. macOS already refocuses on appear and is unaffected.
Fixes#457
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address Codex review: refocus only on return-key submission
The reassert moves from sendMessage() into the TextField's onSubmit, so
the send button no longer reopens a deliberately dismissed keyboard on
iOS and never moves focus on macOS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix the three follow-ups from the #1486 review
Three defects shipped with the censorship-resilience merge, all
confirmed against main:
1. Source-manifest verification silently accepted added files.
shasum -c checks only the files the manifest lists, and the Xcode
project compiles every source file present in the tree — so a
hostile mirror could pass verification by adding a file rather than
modifying one. The manifest header and VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md now
require the completeness check (git status --porcelain, or a path
diff for tarballs) alongside the hash check.
2. A relay removed while Tor was bootstrapping reconnected anyway.
dropRelays never subtracted from pendingTorConnectionURLs, and a
custom relay passes the allow-list filter, so draining the pending
queue resurrected a relay someone had explicitly deleted.
3. Turning Tor off mid-bootstrap read as 'network may be blocking tor'.
shutdownCompletely left the detached 75s poll loop running, which
then stamped bootstrapDidStall over the clean shutdown state; and
the stall handler guarded on torEnforced, which is compile-time true
in release, instead of the runtime preference. The poll loop is now
generation-fenced (shutdown, dormancy, and restart each invalidate
it) and the handler consults persistedTorPreference().
Both app-side fixes carry regression tests proven to fail pre-fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address Codex review: ignored files and manifest placement
git status --porcelain omits ignored paths, and .gitignore covers
build/ — a planted bitchat/build/Evil.swift would compile via the
synchronized group while the documented check stayed silent. The
checkout check now uses --ignored.
The downloaded manifest also has to live outside the tree, or it trips
the completeness checks itself; the doc now says so and references it
at /tmp throughout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tier 3 of a protest-hardening review. The BLE mesh is already properly
fenced off from network reachability and needs nothing here; every gap is
on the internet side, or in how someone gets a build they can trust.
Say when Tor is blocked. The bootstrap poll loop simply ended at its
75-second deadline, leaving isStarting true with no further state, so a
network that blocks Tor was indistinguishable from a slow one and the UI
said "starting tor…" indefinitely. TorManager now exposes
bootstrapDidStall and posts .TorBootstrapDidStall, and the app reports
that mesh messaging still works while internet delivery is paused. It is
cleared on each new start or restart, so a later attempt can report again.
Let relays be added by hand. The four built-in relays are well-known
clearnet hostnames, which is four names for a censor to block and no
recourse short of a new build. NostrRelaySettings persists up to eight
additional relays, normalized, .onion accepted, with a settings editor.
They join the same target set as the built-ins and are subject to the
same activation policy. Removal reconciles against the previous set:
the teardown path iterates the current targets, so without that a removed
relay's socket and queued sends would linger — covered by a test that
fails without it. The merged list is cached rather than recomputed,
because allowedRelayList consults it once per candidate URL and would
otherwise read UserDefaults inside that loop.
Stop stranding people who denied location. The activation gate required
location permission or a mutual favorite, but teleporting into a geohash
requires neither, so someone with no permission and no favorites could
sit in a channel that never connected while Tor and the relays stayed
suppressed and nothing said why. Being in a location channel is now a
third arm of the gate, in both the activation service and the relay
manager's copy of the policy, and leaving the channel closes it again.
Stop burning the Tor timeout when Tor is off. GeoRelayDirectory awaited
Tor readiness unconditionally, but with the preference off TorManager has
been shut down, so every refresh spent the full bootstrap deadline and the
directory froze on its cached copy. It now keys on the preference, not on
live readiness: Tor wanted but unavailable must still skip the fetch
rather than fall back to clearnet.
Say what turning Tor off costs. The toggle's copy described it as
hiding your IP "for location channels", understating both scope and
consequence. It now names private messages too, and while the toggle is
off the settings screen states that every relay can see the device IP.
Make builds verifiable. There was no release verification of any kind:
no signatures, no checksums, no documented procedure. Post-takedown that
is the acute gap, because mirrors appear and people install whatever they
can find during a shutdown. source-manifest.yml publishes a per-tag
SHA-256 manifest with a provenance attestation, self-checking before it
publishes, and docs/VERIFYING-A-BUILD.md explains how to verify source and
states plainly that compiled builds from anywhere but the App Store cannot
be verified. It also records the gaps honestly: no published signing key,
no reproducible build, no non-GitHub mirror.
docs/TOR-INTEGRATION.md was substantially stale — it documented a
torrc, SOCKSPort and ControlPort that the in-process Arti client does not
use, and claimed there are no user-visible settings — so it is rewritten,
including the deferred gap below.
Deferred: no Tor bridges or pluggable transports. arti-client is built
without pt-client or bridge-client and bootstraps from stock config, so
in a country that blocks Tor outright there is still no circumvention
path — only a clear report that there isn't. Closing it needs the Rust
features, bridge config through the FFI, and an xcframework rebuild under
the pinned toolchain with a provenance update, which is its own change.
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Harden what a locked or seized device gives away
The realistic compromise for many of the people this app is built for is
not interception but a phone taken, and often unlocked under coercion.
Content encryption is in good shape; these are the gaps around it.
Hide notification previews, by default. Notification content is rendered
by the system on the lock screen, so it was readable without unlocking:
DM alerts carried the sender's nickname and the full message body, and
geohash alerts put the geohash in the title. Alerts now state that a DM,
mention, or location-channel activity arrived and withhold the rest until
the app is opened. userInfo still carries the routing peer ID and deep
link, neither of which the system displays, so taps land where they did.
A settings toggle restores full previews for anyone who wants them.
Default-on is the deliberate part: a phone face-up on a table should not
narrate conversations, and someone who wants previews can say so.
Cover the window on willResignActive, so the snapshot iOS stores for the
app switcher shows a placeholder rather than an open conversation. Opaque
rather than blurred, because blurred large text stays partly legible and
the snapshot goes to disk. Added synchronously from a UIKit notification
with queue: nil, since the capture follows shortly after and an
OperationQueue hop or a SwiftUI state change can lose that race. Panic
wipe already deleted snapshots already on disk; this stops new ones from
being worth deleting.
Bound media by age as well as size. The 100 MB quota only ever considered
incoming files, so outgoing media had no lifetime at all and a received
photo could outlive its conversation indefinitely. A launch-time sweep now
deletes managed media older than seven days, incoming and outgoing, with
the same exemptions quota eviction honors: in-flight live captures and
files reserved by a delivery or deletion in progress.
Make /clear tell the truth on the mesh timeline. It recorded an echo
watermark and left the gossip archive on disk for up to 6 hours, so
someone who cleared before a police stop had deleted nothing. Clearing now
erases the archive too. The watermark still matters: it suppresses
pre-clear messages this device hears again from peers. The cost is that
the device stops serving recent public backlog until it hears fresh
traffic, which is a fair reading of what clearing a timeline means.
Documented in PRIVACY_POLICY.md and the privacy assessment, including a
new section on what is deliberately NOT addressed: there is still no
duress mechanism of any kind (no decoy passphrase, no wipe-on-failed-auth,
no app lock), macOS gets no file-protection classes, and media is not
sealed at the app layer. The duress question is a product decision as much
as an engineering one, since in some jurisdictions destroying data on
demand is itself an offence and hiding may protect someone better than
destroying, so it is called out rather than guessed at.
Three findings from the audit that prompted this work turned out to be
already fixed on main and are not included: keychain accessibility is
AfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly with a retrying migration, the panic media
wipe uses a two-location durable marker transaction, and panic already
discards staged share-extension content.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Inject the previews preference instead of reading shared defaults
CI caught a real problem this introduced. `NotificationServiceTests`
already asserted the full-preview title and body, and both it and the new
redaction tests read `NotificationPrivacySettings` from
`UserDefaults.standard` in the same process. Whichever ran second
depended on the other's cleanup, so it passed locally and failed in CI:
XCTAssertEqual failed: ("🔒 new dm") is not equal to ("🔒 DM from Alice")
Fixed at the source rather than by ordering or serialization.
`NotificationService` now takes a `hidePreviewsProvider`, defaulting to
the real preference, so each test states which behavior it asserts. The
pre-existing test asks for previews shown and gains a redacted
counterpart; the redaction tests no longer touch the shared store.
`NotificationPrivacySettings` also gained store-injecting accessors so
the default-value and round-trip assertions can use an isolated suite
rather than mutating preferences other tests read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: correct inaccurate privacy and metadata claims
Several documented guarantees did not match the implementation. These
matter more than ordinary doc drift: someone deciding whether to carry
this phone to a protest reads these sentences as the threat model.
- Peer IDs were described as "short ephemeral IDs derived per session"
that "rotate periodically" and "prevent tracking". They are the first
8 bytes of the Noise static key fingerprint, stable across sessions
and reboots, and replaced only by a panic wipe. Corrected in the
whitepaper (§3, §8), IdentityModels, and BitchatProtocol, whose
header notes claimed "no persistent identifiers in protocol headers"
while every header carries exactly one.
- "No plaintext message content is ever written to disk" was false for
accepted media, which is stored unsealed under the platform's
data-protection class. Narrowed to what actually holds.
- Padding was described as applying to all packets but fragments. Only
noiseEncrypted and noiseHandshake frames are padded; the pad bytes
equal the pad length rather than being random; and because that
length must fit one byte, a frame needing over 255 bytes of padding
is emitted unpadded. Documented in the whitepaper (§4.1) and
MessagePadding.
- The gossip archive window is 6 hours in production, not the
15 minutes claimed in PRIVACY_POLICY.md and the privacy assessment.
The 15-minute figure is the struct default that BLEService overrides.
- The privacy assessment credited iOS BLE address randomization without
noting that stable app-layer identifiers defeat it.
The whitepaper's future-work list now names the changes these
corrections imply: rotating on-air identity, padding for non-Noise
types, and making the announce neighbor list optional.
No behavior change; comments and documentation only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: correct the same claims in the README
The README repeats two of the claims corrected elsewhere in this PR, and
it is the document people actually read before deciding to trust the app.
- "no persistent identifiers" is the inverse of what the mesh does; it
now points at the whitepaper's identity and metadata sections.
- "end-to-end encryption with forward secrecy" holds for live Noise
sessions but not for sealed store-and-forward mail, which the
whitepaper already flags as its main cryptographic trade-off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two CI-robustness fixes for the iOS-simulator job seen on main:
1. The destination picker no longer dies on runner images with placeholder/unavailable simulator lists (macos-26-arm64 20260720.0258): it filters error/unavailable rows, falls back to xcrun simctl's available-device list, and as a last resort creates a simulator from the newest installed iOS runtime's own supported iPhone device types. Each path logs which route was taken.
2. Deflakes NoiseEncryptionServiceTests' quarantine-restore test: the injected 20ms responder timeout also armed during the SETUP handshake, so a loaded runner tore down the half-open responder session before the scenario began (production quarantine/restore verified correct — the failure signature was a fresh msg2 to a session-less peer). Timeout raised to 1s and the fixed 100ms sleep replaced with a bounded waitUntil on the restore condition. No assertion weakened; 10/10 sequential + 3/3 under full-core CPU load.
DMs sent through an established Noise session are retained in the durable MessageRouter outbox until an authenticated delivery/read ack, and retried under the same message ID when the peer's replacement handshake authenticates — fixing DMs silently lost into stale local sessions after a remote app restart. Mesh ack handling is peer-scoped end-to-end (alias-scoped delivery status, peer-bound markDelivered, PeerMessageKey retry state), so a colliding message ID from another conversation can no longer clear or promote foreign state; bridge-drop dedup keys are recipient-scoped with hashed persistence.
Includes review fix: acks arriving after a relaunch (durable outbox restored, conversation not) now clear the peer-scoped router entry unconditionally — only the UI status transition is gated on conversation presence — so a delivered message can no longer re-send to the attempt cap and be marked failed despite delivery. Regression test simulates the relaunch through real store persistence; the dead allowedPeerIDs parameter (unscoped-tombstone trap) is removed.
Joins the two authenticated aliases of one account — the full noise-key conversation ID used by the Nostr path and its derived 16-hex mesh short ID — into one canonical conversation, migrating messages and handing off an open DM sheet (short ID while connected, stable ID offline). Delivery/read-ack outbox removal is scoped to the authenticated peer's aliases with per-peer tombstones, so a colliding message ID queued for a different peer survives, including across protected-data cold-load recovery. Geohash DMs never enter the alias path (their conversation keys carry no noise key).
Presenting the root Bluetooth alert while the people/DM sheet was up forced SwiftUI to dismiss the sheet, whose binding setter called endConversation() — destroying the open DM. The root alert is now gated behind a modal-presentation guard (scene active, no competing modal), a second copy presents from inside the sheet, and the sheet-dismissal setter only ends the conversation when the dismissal is genuinely explicit.
Includes review fix: the voice-recording error alert (mic permission denied inside an open DM) destroyed the DM through the exact same path — it now participates in the same guard and gating pattern at both root and sheet level.
Receiver-side private-media deletion (per-bubble delete and /clear) becomes a write-ahead transaction: a deletion journal in BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore is the atomic commit point, materialization (tombstones + payload unlinks) is idempotent and retried on recovery, path reservations in BLEIncomingFileStore prevent delete racing an in-flight arrival, and overlapping /clear operations are serialized with panic-generation invalidation. Integrates with the receipt quarantine (a pending journal entry outranks quarantine; materialization never resurrects a quarantined ID).
Review fixes included: (1) /clear no longer deletes outgoing media mirrored into another conversation (alias protection now mirrors the incoming path, with a regression test that fails pre-fix); (2) explicit delete of legacy incoming media actually unlinks the decrypted payload when unreferenced — gated on pending-delivery/reservation state, restoring main's delete semantics safely instead of leaving plaintext for quota cleanup; (3) refused deletions surface a localized system message in the affected chat instead of failing silently (30-locale key). Full local suite 1876 green.
Sender-side retry of private media whose local BLE fragment completion never received a remote delivery receipt: the encrypted file packet is retained in memory (bounded: 8 packets / 4MB / 120s / 2 retries per message / 2 per reconnect) and re-sent on peer reconnect or re-authentication, gated at four boundaries on capability bit 9 plus the exact Noise session generation, so legacy or bit-8-only peers can never receive a retry and the receiver's stable-ID ledger dedups anything re-sent. Remote delivery/read receipts release retention; limits and expiry end in a visible failed status.
Includes review fix: a dropped policy-resolution callback can no longer wedge retries for a peer — the pending resolution is cleared on peer disconnect (with a regression test proving recovery).
Adds a durable receiver-side ledger (BLEPrivateMediaReceiptStore) mapping a deterministic private-media message ID — hash-bound to sender, recipient, and entropy-bearing filename — to the stored file before UI delivery and before the Noise-encrypted delivery ACK, so sender retries and relaunches cannot create duplicate bubbles or files. Receipts are unforgeable without the Noise session; capability bit 9 rides the existing announce bitfield (no wire-format change; rolling upgrade safe both directions).
Includes review fixes: corrupt receipt records are quarantined per-record (bytes preserved at <id>.json.corrupt, only that ID fail-closed — previously one bad record silently disabled ALL inbound private media forever); the panic reset now reaches BLEService's own store instance via completePanicReset with a production-wiring test; and both content.delivery.reason.* strings ship with full 30-locale coverage.
Removes the nested-Task deferral when typed transport events reach ChatViewModel: didReceiveTransportEvent now dispatches to @MainActor *Synchronously coordinator methods inline within the single notifyUI main-actor hop, fixing a real ordering race where a delivery-status update emitted right after a message could apply before the message existed in the ConversationStore and be dropped. Adds SynchronousMessageTransportEventDelegate so BLEService.deliverTransportEvent returns a documented accepted/unconfirmed verdict for .messageReceived (consumed by the private-media receipt layer above). Intra-main-actor only — no cross-queue sync added; the bleQueue-never-blocks-on-main invariant is preserved.
Companion to #1463 (they were built as a unit): adds a bounded deferral buffer (4/peer, 32 global, byte-budgeted, responder-timeout lifetime) for ciphertext that arrives before XX message 3 or before BLE installs generation-bound transport state, retried exactly once after the serialized authentication/restore callback. Reclassifies malformed/forged/replayed/oversized/rate-limited ciphertext as drop-only, so attacker bytes can no longer evict an established session (on main, a 1-byte forgery evicts the session via the old clearSession + re-handshake path). Serializes Noise packet reception as messageQueue barriers.
Honors #1463's timeout-restore deferral through the same-generation ready path (verified by negative test: without the gate, parked DMs drain under discarded keys). Full local suite 1789 tests green.
Replaces destroy-then-rebuild Noise re-handshakes with an atomic reconnect protocol: prepared XX message-1 handoff tokens (claim-once, invalidated by crossed inbound initiations), receive-only quarantine of the established transport while an inbound replacement proves identity (promote on success, rollback+cooldown on failure/timeout), deterministic lower-peerID-wins crossed-initiator resolution, and a per-link-epoch BLE revalidation policy that re-proves cached sessions inside the same bleQueue critical section as the link rebind. On main, a fresh msg1 simply destroys an established session and rekey spans two non-atomic barriers.
Includes the review fix: timeout-restores defer outbound queue draining until the convergence retry completes (restore reason plumbed end-to-end), so DMs are never drained under keys a restarted peer already discarded — with a deterministic interleaving test. Identity-mismatch restores drain immediately. Full local suite 1768 tests green.
Split-out safe half of #1437 (the kind-1402 wire migration stays held for Android coordination). Docs (README/WHITEPAPER/PRIVACY_POLICY/privacy-assessment) now describe the actual proprietary DM construction — kind 1059 gift wrap carrying XChaCha20-Poly1305 with a 24-byte nonce, base64url v2: framing, and an HKDF that borrows the nip44-v2 info label but is not the NIP-44 key schedule — instead of claiming NIP-17/44/59.
Hardens the existing legacy inbound path: 64 KiB ciphertext cap before decode (~46x the largest producible legacy envelope), outer kind/recipient-tag/signature binding, tagless kind-13 seal binding, unsigned kind-14 inner binding, inner tags restricted to the two shapes deployed clients emit (verified against every historical iOS release and a fixture frozen from Android production), SecRandomCopyBytes failure now throws, non-UTF-8 plaintext now throws instead of returning empty. Adds frozen cross-platform fixtures with hash-pinned generators; interop-reviewed with no rejection surface for deployed clients.
Injects the location-notes enabled getter and settings-change publisher into NearbyNotesCounter (defaults reproduce the prior wiring exactly), so tests no longer mutate the persistent UserDefaults key shared across parallel test worker processes. No production behavior change.
Un-stacked from the Codex chain (both files were byte-identical between main and the parent branch) and rebased onto the post-#1479 deflaked test suite.
Closes the last cleartext private-content path over BLE: private DM images/voice were sent as plaintext signed fileTransfer packets, TTL-relayed across the mesh, so every relay saw the full bytes. Now the complete BitchatFilePacket is encrypted as a single Noise AEAD message (inner type 0x20, matching Android) and the opaque ciphertext is fragmented. Adds an authenticated in-session capability proof (0x21 TLV: capabilities + Ed25519 key), TOFU-style downgrade pinning, a per-send consent dialog for the signed-cleartext fallback to legacy peers, and a cancellation/admission registry so cancel/delete cannot race a deferred cleartext send.
Android wire constants (0x20 / 0x21 / capability bit 8) confirmed shipping. The 256-fragment preflight cap applies only to the directed fileTransfer migration fallback; encrypted media to capable peers uses the full receiver ceiling.
Rebased over #1428/#1349: identity reads go through BLELocalIdentityStateStore; the session-bound authenticated signing-key check and the announce-path TOFU pin are kept as complementary checks. Full local suite green (1744+197 tests).
Raises the file-local waitUntil default from 1s to 10s (returns early on success, so zero cost on healthy runs) and fixes a latent race in the observers test: it waited on the fetch-probe request count, which increments before handleFetchSuccess settles isFetching/lastFetchAt on the MainActor, so the next trigger notification posted into that gap was silently swallowed by the guard. Now waits on the .geoRelayDirectoryDidRefresh notification posted at the end of the synchronous success handler. Negative checks assert against captured baselines. No assertion weakened; 15/15 x 9 local runs including under 2x-ncpu CPU load.
Replaces the share-extension handoff that auto-sent shared text/URLs into the current channel with a validated, single-slot 24h envelope that shows the destination and a bounded preview and requires an explicit tap to copy into the composer — it never sends. Rejects malformed/oversized/control-character/non-HTTP(S)/expired payloads (including bidi-override U+202E), and clears on consume/cancel/expiry/panic.
Rebased onto main with Persian strings added for all new keys (30-locale coverage verified), plus a panic-recovery clear so an envelope staged during an interrupted wipe cannot survive relaunch.
TOFU-pins the Ed25519 signing key per noise key so a self-consistent announce that reuses a victim's peerID+noise key with the attacker's signing key/nickname is rejected instead of overwriting the registry and persisted identity. Complements #1432: that PR's signed-LEAVE verification reads the stored signing key this PR protects from announce-path poisoning.
Rebased onto main as a single commit; swift build --build-tests green, 40/40 targeted tests incl. the spoofing e2e cases, and #1432's suites 50/50 unaffected.
Converts BLEAnnounceThrottle to a lock-backed class and moves myPeerID/myPeerIDData/myNickname into a lock-backed BLELocalIdentityStateStore snapshot, so announces can never observe a split peer-ID/wire-ID during panic rotation. Serializes sendAnnounce onto the messageQueue barrier and moves the panic-reset pendingNoiseSessionQueues clear onto collectionsQueue (the queue every other mutation site uses).
Rebased onto main after #1431/#1432; integrates with #1431's panic-suspend structure (guard retained in both the outer sendAnnounce and the deferred worker).
Moves inbound Nostr Schnorr verification and NIP-17 gift-wrap decryption off the main actor into per-relay bounded AsyncStream pipelines (parallel across relays, ordered per relay), dedups before crypto, and removes the redundant second re-verify in NostrInboundPipeline/GeoPresenceTracker. Adds a panic-wipe generation counter so in-flight decrypts are discarded after a wipe.
Rebased onto main; #1451's 256 KiB pre-parse byte cap and tag limits are preserved and still enforced before any crypto/allocation.
Replaces the scheduled workflow that pushed upstream georelay CSV directly to main unreviewed with a validator-backed automation that resolves an immutable upstream commit, validates against the reviewed baseline, and opens a non-auto-merged PR (or tracking issue) instead of writing to main. Adds a mirrored strict client-side validator in GeoRelayDirectory (all-or-nothing, size/row/host/coord caps, streamed 512KiB cap, >=50% baseline overlap) that fails safe to last-known-good, and retargets runtime refresh to bitchat's reviewed copy.
Replaces ConversationStore's message-ID->physical-index map with logical indexes plus a head indexOffset, so cap-eviction advances the offset instead of rebuilding the whole dictionary on every steady-state append (~23.7x measured ingest throughput at cap). Adds a steady-state benchmark floor and a 1,200-op differential stress test against an O(n) reference model.
Rewrites just clean/nuke to remove only ignored build artifacts (.DerivedData/.build), never git-checkout or rm tracked project files (previously could destroy uncommitted work). Adds a CI guard (check-just-clean-safety.sh) against reintroducing source-mutating cleanup, plus README/Local.xcconfig modernization.
Adds an ios-tests CI job that runs the UIKit/CoreBluetooth-conditional suite on the first available iPhone simulator (serial), and fixes the coverage-summary step ordering so the profile isn't invalidated by the serial benchmark rebuild.
Adds remote-static-key->peerID binding at Noise handshake completion (closes a mesh impersonation/MITM hole where a peer could complete a handshake under another peer's ID). Also hardens LEAVE handling to require a verified signature and suppresses relay of unverifiable leaves.
* Make panic wipe deterministic and device-bound
* Scope install markers to iOS
* Harden panic recovery and service shutdown
* Invalidate queued BLE ingress during panic
* Harden panic keychain and media cleanup
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jack <jack@deck.local>
* Add Persian (fa) localization and an in-app language picker
Persian was the one notable gap in the 29-language catalog. Translate all
381 strings (plus the share extension) with proper plural substitutions,
and register fa in knownRegions.
Settings gains a LANGUAGE section: a picker over every language the bundle
ships (native names via Locale), backed by an AppleLanguages override so
users can run bitchat in a language different from the device's. Localization
resolves at process start, so the picker surfaces a restart note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Remove unused AppLanguageSettings.currentOverride (Periphery)
AppInfoView reads the override via @AppStorage, so the accessor was dead
code and failed the Periphery CI scan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jack <212554440+jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
* Bound public rate-limit buckets against attacker-keyed growth.
Keep the NIP-13 PoW sender bypass, skip content-bucket minting on
sender reject, and evict idle/oldest entries at a hard cap.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Stop Cashu-looking text from skipping long-message guards.
Oversized public content always collapses and takes the plain
formatting path so remote tokens cannot force layout/regex DoS.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Cap teleported geohash participant markers.
Bound the set with FIFO eviction, clear it on channel switch, and
prune markers that leave the visible participant list.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Bound untrusted Nostr relay frames and event tags.
Reject oversized inbound messages before JSON parse, cap tag
arrays/values at decode, and stop logging raw tag contents.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Fail soft when Noise handshake state is unexpectedly missing.
Replace the initiator startHandshake force unwrap with a guard
that throws invalidState instead of crashing.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Cap geohash nickname cache from remote Nostr events.
FIFO-evict at capacity, clear on channel switch, and prune
nicknames that leave the visible participant list.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Avoid overlapping exclusive access in the rate limiter.
Make bucket helpers static so inout dictionary updates do not
conflict with a mutating call on self.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Fix rate-limiter tests for mutating allow under #expect.
Call allow outside the macro so Swift Testing does not capture an
immutable copy of the struct.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Drop unused WebSocket data helper; reset rate limiter on panic wipe.
dataWithinInboundLimit replaced the unbounded path, and panic clear
should not leave public intake buckets behind.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: use country-level resolution for low-precision geohashes (#887)
* fix: skip admin fallback when country exists but is duplicate
Prevents mixed labels like "United Kingdom and Scotland" for
single-country geohashes. Admin fallback now only triggers when
no country is available from the placemark.
* fix: migrate stale low-precision bookmark names so country-first logic applies
Users who bookmarked a <=2-char geohash before the country-first resolver
kept the old administrativeArea cache (e.g. "England" for `gc`) because
resolveBookmarkNameIfNeeded bails when bookmarkNames[gh] is non-nil. Add a
one-shot, versioned migration that drops cached names for <=2-char geohashes
on load; the next LocationChannelsSheet .onAppear re-resolves them via the
fixed logic. Higher-precision entries are untouched.
* Fix low-precision geohash country names
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <212554440+jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Centralize PTT and voice audio-session ownership, harden courier/bridge/outbox delivery and recovery, correct location and delivery-state races, add privacy/release metadata, and ship reproducible universal Arti slices with Release CI coverage.
Validated by the full iOS suite, repeated audio/fragment/performance regressions, BitFoundation tests, strict lint and dead-code analysis, universal iOS Release builds, and iOS/macOS archives.
* Consolidate duplicate BLE links after restore; suppress duplicate fragment streams; onChange coalescing
Field evidence (two-phone test after BLE state-restoration relaunches):
both phones held 2-3 simultaneous same-role connections to each other —
one side received every packet from three distinct centrals all bound to
the same peer — so every PTT voice frame arrived 3x, and a 41KB voice
file went out as TWO complete independent 89-fragment streams (different
assembly ids), both fully reassembled and the duplicate only dropped at
the very end by messageID dedup. 2-3x airtime/battery on all traffic
plus doubled reassembly memory.
Root causes and fixes:
- Duplicate links stayed unbound forever: announces (the only packet
that binds a link to a peer) went through the per-peer duplicate-link
collapse, so a peer's second/third link never received the announce it
needed to become bound — and unbound links pass the collapse untouched,
so every broadcast sprayed down all of them. Direct announces now
bypass the collapse and reach every live link (relayed announces keep
it); once bound, the existing collapse dedups all traffic.
- Same-role link retirement: a verified direct announce now consolidates
our central-role connections to that peer — keep the link the announce
arrived on (or the most recently bound one), cancel other connected
links bound to the same peer. One connection per role per peer is the
normal dual-role topology; only same-role duplicates are touched, only
links already announce-bound are retired (never pre-announce links),
at most one retirement per peer per rebind-cooldown window, and the
peer keeps a live link either way. Directness stays forgeable (TTL is
unsigned), so a replay could nominate the survivor — bounded by the
cooldown and by DM routing's existing canDeliverSecurely gate. A
rotation rebind now also cancels other stale links still bound to the
rotated-away ID, so the ghost identity retires promptly.
- Deterministic preferred-link collapse: when several bound links to one
peer are candidates, collapse now keeps the peer's most recently bound
link (the reverse-mapped one) instead of dictionary order; links
without a discovered characteristic are excluded from fanout (they
cannot be written to, and could silently eat a peer's collapsed copy).
links(to:) now reports all bound peripheral links, and removing one
duplicate no longer clobbers the reverse map of the survivor.
- Duplicate fragment streams: a transferId-less resend (gossip-sync
replay, spool) of file content already being fragmented out to a
covering audience is dropped at the outbound scheduler (broadcast
covers everyone; directed covers its recipient). App-initiated sends
carry an explicit transferId the progress UI tracks and always run.
A peer that asks after the stream completes still gets a resend.
- didUnsubscribeFrom no longer flaps a peer that is still live on other
links (the far side retiring its duplicate arrives as an unsubscribe);
didDisconnectPeripheral bookkeeping is skipped for self-retired links
by removing the store entry before cancelling.
Also: guard the DeliveryStatus onChange state write in TextMessageView/
MediaMessageView (unconditional per-row writes under a message storm
tripped SwiftUI's "tried to update multiple times per frame" warning).
The restore-path bgRemaining=∞ log was already fixed on main (#1425
review follow-up 07b5ac31: init-time seed + sampler-routed restore
captures); verified, no change needed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Review fixes: multi-link disconnect guard, characteristic-aware retirement
Adversarial review of the duplicate-link PR (merge-with-nits):
- didDisconnectPeripheral gets the same multi-link guard as the
unsubscribe path: when a duplicate link drops naturally while the peer
stays live on another (dual-role central link, or a second bound link
during the post-restore consolidation window), peer-disconnect
bookkeeping (markDisconnected + disconnect notify) no longer runs — a
UI blip until the next announce re-marked the peer connected. The
reverse map was just repaired onto a connected survivor, so
directLinkState is the accurate probe. Scan restart and connect-slot
refill stay unguarded: they respond to the physical drop regardless of
remaining logical links. (No unit test: driving the CBCentralManager
delegate requires CBPeripheral instances, which cannot be constructed
in tests; the policy pieces backing the guard are covered.)
- Retirement is now characteristic-aware: the policy snapshot carries
characteristic presence, and keptPeripheralUUID selects anchors only
among writable links while any exist — consolidation must not keep a
link mid-service-rediscovery (didModifyServices cleared its
characteristic) and cancel the writable duplicate, stranding outbound
traffic on the central link until rediscovery finishes. When neither
anchor is writable but a writable duplicate exists, consolidation
defers to a later announce instead of guessing. The reverse-map
survivor repair in removePeripheral prefers writable links for the
same reason. Three new policy tests cover charless-vs-writable.
Deferred with code comments per review: central-side collapse keeps the
oldest subscription (no recency signal; remote consolidates within its
cooldown), and the extra preferred-bindings bleQueue hop in
sendOnAllLinks (fold into a combined snapshot if profiling flags it).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: jack <jackjackbits@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
